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DON’T JUST DO SOMETHING!: E-HEARSAY,
THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION, AND
THE CASE FOR CAUTION IN THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS
LIESA L. RICHTER∗
This Article weighs in on the cutting-edge debate regarding the effects of electronic
hearsay or “e-hearsay” on the truth-seeking function of the trial process. Professor
Jeffrey Bellin recently raised an urgent call to revise the present sense impression
exception to the hearsay rule as a result of the explosion of hearsay on-line,
recommending a “percipient witness” amendment to the rule. This Article responds to
Professor Bellin and argues that a “percipient witness” requirement is not only
unnecessary, but potentially deleterious to the goal of a rational and fair trial system to
achieve accurate fact-finding.
While e-hearsay may be dressed up in contemporary vernacular and preserved in a
novel format, it remains human communication. This Article argues that, because
existing hearsay doctrine was designed to deal with human communication with all of
its frailties and idiosyncrasies in whatever form it may take, amendments to account
for e-hearsay are unnecessary. Further, this Article highlights the overlooked benefits of
electronic present sense impressions to the trial process, particularly in the domestic
violence context, where critical victim hearsay within other exceptions is now excluded
by the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v.
Washington and its progeny. This Article urges confidence in the ability of trial
judges to regulate the latest installment in ever-evolving platforms of communication
and counsels restraint in the rulemaking process.
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a truly fascinating conversation regarding hearsay in the age of the tweet.
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Finally, should trial courts demonstrably fail to regulate e-hearsay under existing
rules when given the opportunity, this article outlines four potential alternatives to a
“percipient witness” requirement that would preserve valuable evidence and be
consistent with the goal of the Federal Rules of Evidence to ascertain “the truth and
secur[e] a just determination.”
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“Don’t just do something—stand there!”1
INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen an explosion of technology into
everyday existence. Ordinary citizens, including small children, walk
around with hand-held devices that possess wireless capabilities
This
reminiscent of Star Trek episodes of the late 1960s.2
technological revolution has enormous implications in multiple legal
contexts, including criminal enterprise and its investigation, privacy,
free speech, trademark, personal jurisdiction, and discovery, to name
but a few.3 In the past decade, legal scholars, practitioners, and
legislators have launched a multitude of projects designed to reform
existing legal standards to meet contemporary technological
realities.4 Predictably, academic journals are filled with proposed
revisions to traditional legal rules and policies to accommodate swiftly
advancing technology and communication norms.5

1. See ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Walt Disney Pictures 1951) (spoken by the white
rabbit); see also THE EXECUTIVE’S BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 94 (Julia Vitullo-Martin & J.
Robert Moskin, eds., 1994) (attributing quotation to George P. Shultz, former
Secretary of State).
2. See David Allen Batchelor, The Science of Star Trek, NASA,
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/technology/features/star_trek.html (last visited July 11,
2012) (discussing the technology Star Trek writers created to use in the show and its
popularity in modern culture).
3. See, e.g., United State v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that attachment
of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle constitutes a search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780, 2791 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the
contemporary problem of personal jurisdiction in the Internet age).
4. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical
Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 409–10 (2010) (describing provisions and purposes of
Communications Decency Act Internet immunity); Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery &
Beyond: Toward a Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 647–59 (2006)
(discussing amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to account for
electronic discovery); Christopher G. Clark, Note, The Truth in Domain Names Act of
2003 and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1476,
1505–07 (2004) (describing the Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003).
5. See generally David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet
Economy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1987 (2008) (discussing the lack of law to govern
businesses with “multi-sided platforms”); Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the
Courts Battle Over the First Amendment: Can the Law Really Protect Children from
Pornography on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141 (2003)
(arguing that the Supreme Court should clearly define its test for obscenity); Michael
J. Madison, The Narratives of Cyberspace Law (or, Learning from Casablanca), 27 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 249 (2004) (discussing how the Internet lacks the material characteristics
that define traditional copyright law); Robert K. Magovern, Comment, The Expert
Agency and the Public Interest: Why the Department of Justice Should Leave Online Obscenity
to the FCC, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 327 (2003) (positing that the FCC and
Department of Justice should create and enforce regulations of obscenity on the
Internet).
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While amending rules and policies to keep pace with technology
undoubtedly can be necessary, legal reformers should be wary of
change for its own sake. Not all legal standards are similarly
susceptible to changing cultural and communication media, and
some circumspection is in order. Without careful analysis, rapid
changes to first legal principles to address ongoing technological
progress may usher in unintended negative consequences and serve
to undermine long-standing legal standards of continuing
significance. Further, such revisions may provide few long-term
solutions as a result of the moving technological target they seek to
hit. This Article will sound a cautionary note amid the clamor for
change by highlighting the dangers of hasty revision of long-standing
legal standards and illustrating the benefits of allowing such
standards to evolve with technology in some instances.
This Article will examine the dangers of overreaction and the
benefits of patience in connection with a recent proposal to amend
the evidentiary hearsay doctrine to accommodate the technological
transformation of communities through social media websites.6
Because technology has dramatically altered the methods by which
humans communicate, commentators are concerned about the
potential impact on the hearsay doctrine, which limits the
admissibility of human assertions made outside the courtroom.
Technology promises to preserve voluminous hearsay evidence
heretofore lost to the trial process. In fact, there is some indication
that the current culture of online social media not only preserves
hearsay information, but may also promote the creation of previously
non-existent electronic hearsay or “e-hearsay” evidence. In the era of
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, communication norms now
contemplate the constant online posting and texting of real-time
information about activities, events, thoughts, emotions, and
observations. Courts and litigants will be forced to adapt existing
doctrine to regulate the admissibility of this e-hearsay or develop new
standards to control its flow into the courtroom.
One hearsay exception that has come under fire as ill-suited to the
current communication climate is the exception for the present sense
impression.7 The present sense impression exception, which is
recognized by the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as by the
majority of states, permits admission of a hearsay statement that
describes or explains an event or condition while, or immediately
6. See Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense
Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 337–38 (2012).
7. Id.
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after, the speaker perceives that event or condition.8 The exception
is currently listed prominently as the first hearsay exception in
Federal Rule of Evidence 803.9 Before its adoption in the Federal
Rules, however, the present sense impression exception was subject to
great debate, characterized by common law rejection, judicial
resistance, and scholarly disagreement as to its merits.10
In light of the constant stream of observations, descriptions, and
commentary on social media websites, Professor Jeffrey Bellin
recently urged amendment of the present sense impression
exception to prevent the free flow of social media e-hearsay into the
trial process.11 Due to the inherent unreliability of tweets, texts,
status updates, and other e-hearsay, Professor Bellin recommends
adding a “percipient witness” requirement as a condition of
admissibility for present sense impression evidence.12 This revision to
the present sense impression exception would exclude such hearsay
from the trial process in the absence of a testifying witness capable of
corroborating the events it describes.
This Article argues that a percipient witness proposal should be
rejected. First and foremost, amending the present sense impression
exception to account for the rise of e-hearsay is unnecessary. Ehearsay may be dressed up in contemporary vernacular and preserved
in a novel format, but it remains human communication. Existing
hearsay doctrine was designed to deal with human communication
with all of its frailties and idiosyncrasies in whatever form it may
take.13 The creation and preservation of hearsay in electronic form,
therefore, provides no basis for charging in to refashion timehonored hearsay principles. E-hearsay is simply a convenient and
modern platform from which to launch the same assault on the
present sense impression that has plagued the hearsay exception
from its inception.
Furthermore, adding a percipient witness requirement to the
present sense impression exception would damage the trial process
8. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
9. Id.
10. See generally, Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense
Impression Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319 (2009)
(describing the history of the present sense impression, as well as judicial and
scholarly rejection of the exception).
11. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 338 (suggesting that “courts and legislatures
update the present sense impression exception by requiring corroboration by a
percipient witness as a prerequisite to admission”).
12. Id.
13. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining a “statement” for purposes of hearsay as a
“person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or non-verbal conduct, if the person
intended it as an assertion”).
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by eliminating relevant and reliable evidence. This Article will
analyze the overlooked potential benefit of previously unavailable
texts, tweets and status updates to the truth-seeking process,
particularly in the domestic violence context where such e-hearsay
can be expected to serve a critical role following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Crawford v. Washington.14 The Federal
Rules of Evidence are designed to “ascertain[] the truth and secur[e]
The availability of contemporaneous
a just determination.” 15
information regarding disputed events promises to advance the
important goal of generating accurate trial outcomes.
Finally, because e-hearsay represents nothing fundamentally new in
the communication landscape, trial judges can be expected to rise to
the e-hearsay challenge and control the flow of electronic or “e”present sense impressions into court using existing standards. In
keeping with the strong common law tradition that is the backbone
of the law of evidence, trial judges should, at a minimum, be afforded
the opportunity to try—before rule-makers act—to protect the trial
process from potentially improvident e-hearsay admission. Should
there be a documented failure to regulate e-hearsay using existing
requirements of the present sense impression, rule-makers could act,
armed with a record to support potential modifications to the hearsay
exception.
Even then, the addition of a percipient witness
requirement would be akin to prescribing decapitation to cure a
headache. Such an amendment would largely undermine the utility
of the present sense impression as a source of helpful information. If
revision is pursued, rule-makers should first explore less draconian
amendments that are more consistent with evidentiary policy.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the history of the present
sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, as well as its existing
requirements under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1). Part I
highlights the significant protections against the admission of wholly
unsupported e-hearsay statements within the current framework of
the Federal Rules. In addition, Part I reviews judicial treatment of
the present sense impression, revealing a cautious and thoughtful
approach to present sense impressions that promises to extend into
the e-hearsay arena.
Part II of this piece explores the present sense impression in the
context of the Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence outlined in Crawford v. Washington and its progeny. As

14. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
15. FED. R. EVID. 102.
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scholars have thoroughly documented, the Crawford paradigm
excludes a substantial amount of “testimonial” hearsay evidence
previously utilized in the context of domestic violence prosecutions,
where victims routinely fail to appear at trial for cross-examination.16
In the wake of Crawford, the present sense impression exception
appears to be a significant source of constitutionally permissible
“nontestimonial” hearsay. Part II demonstrates that revision of the
present sense impression exception to add a percipient witness
requirement threatens to close the door on this last source of
evidence to protect victims of domestic violence. Part II concludes
that allowing trial judges to utilize existing limitations on the
admissibility of present sense impressions under the Federal Rules of
Evidence may provide the best balance between the interests of
criminal defendants and those of crime victims.
Part III of this Article articulates concerns regarding the timing,
scope, and substance of any proposed amendment to the present
sense impression exception to account for shifting norms of
communication. Part III counsels against piecemeal amendment of
individual hearsay exceptions in response to the e-hearsay explosion.
To the extent that rule-makers perceive an urgent need to amend the
present sense impression exception to account for e-hearsay,
however, Part III argues that the proposed percipient witness
requirement would largely eliminate the utility of present sense
impressions by admitting them only when they are duplicative of live
testimony. Part III also highlights the difficult interpretive issues that
would be injected into the present sense impression by a percipient
witness requirement. Finally, Part III proposes four potential
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would better serve
the policy underlying the present sense impression exception and the
Rules generally, as alternatives to a stifling percipient witness
requirement.
I.

THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION EXCEPTION: THEN AND NOW

Federal Rule of Evidence 802 prohibits the admission of hearsay

16. See, e.g., Clifford S. Fishman, Confrontation, Forfeiture and Giles v. California:
An Interim User’s Guide, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 703 (2009) (observing that although
Crawford did not involve the prosecution of domestic violence, the arresting impact
the majority decision would have on testimony sought to be introduced at such
prosecutions was “obvious”); Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The
Lessons of Regina v. Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 115 (2010) (proffering that the Crawford majority’s
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause “profoundly affected domestic violence
cases, making it much harder to prosecute them successfully”).
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statements in federal trials unless an enumerated hearsay exception
applies to the particular out of court assertion at issue.17 In so doing,
Rule 802 continues the long-standing common law rejection of
hearsay evidence of questionable reliability and insists upon in-court
testimony under oath subject to contemporaneous cross-examination
by witnesses with first-hand knowledge of events they describe.18 The
Federal Rules of Evidence provide numerous exceptions to the ban
on hearsay evidence based upon notions of fairness, necessity, and
reliability.19 The hearsay exception allowing the admission of present
sense impressions is contained within Federal Rule of Evidence 803.20
The Rule 803 hearsay exceptions apply regardless of whether the
declarant testifies at trial and, indeed, regardless of whether the
declarant is available for trial.21
A. The Contours of the Contemporary Present Sense Impression
Present sense impressions are hearsay statements that explain or
describe an event or condition made while the speaker perceives that
very event or condition or “immediately thereafter.” 22 Because the
hearsay statement is uttered contemporaneously with the observation
or immediately thereafter, such a statement is free from significant
concerns of failed memory—one of the pivotal concerns underlying
the hearsay doctrine.23 Further, the lack of time for reflection
between observation and speech also lends to the statement’s
By
perceived freedom from risks of deliberate insincerity.24
definition, the speaker must have personal knowledge of the event or

17. FED. R. EVID. 802.
18. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII introductory note (offering that the requirement
that a testifying witness be present, under oath, and subject to cross examination,
evolved from the notion that a witness’s value is derived from her “perception,”
“memory,” “narration,” and “sincerity” (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948))). This
preference for live testimony finds support in the Constitution to the extent that
evidence is admitted against a criminal defendant. The Sixth Amendment preserves
the right of the accused to confront his accusers, and thus limits the admission of
hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant. 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
19. See 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
8:31 (3d ed. 2007).
20. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See United States v. Brewer, 36 F.3d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Statements of
present sense impression are considered reliable because the immediacy eliminates
the concern for lack of memory and precludes time for intentional deception.”
(quoting 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 438
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
24. See id. at 271–72.
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Based upon these factors and
condition described as well.25
philosophies, the present sense impression is listed as the first
exception to the hearsay rule in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1).26
B. The Checkered Past of the Present Sense Impression
While the present sense impression enjoys a position of
prominence as the first enumerated hearsay exception in Rule 803, it
is a relative newcomer to the hearsay landscape. Throughout the
evolution of the hearsay doctrine, distinguished evidence scholars
have disagreed sharply over the viability of the present sense
impression.27 As a result, the exception struggled for recognition and
did not gain widespread acceptance in federal or state courts until
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.28
James Bradley Thayer, the most influential evidentiary scholar of
the nineteenth century,29 first extracted the concept of the present
sense impression from the doctrine of res gestae.30
Thayer
emphasized the importance of the timing of the hearsay statement
and concluded that substantial contemporaneity between the event
perceived and the declarant’s description were sufficient to justify an
exception to the hearsay rule.31 Indeed, Thayer postulated that
present sense impressions were more accurate than traditionally
accepted excited utterances.32 He theorized that excitement can, in
fact, decrease a declarant’s ability to perceive and narrate events with
accuracy, thus diminishing the reliability of excited utterances.33 In
contrast, the declarant’s description of the more mundane events
envisioned by the present sense impression is less susceptible to such
concerns.34 Moreover, Thayer noted motivational concerns in the
context of excited utterances, where the required excitement in the

25. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“In a hearsay situation, the
declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with
the requirement of firsthand knowledge.”).
26. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
27. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 326–29 (describing the conflict between
Thayer’s support for the present sense impression exception and Wigmore’s
rejection of it, and noting subsequent criticism of the present sense impression by
both scholars and courts across the country).
28. Id. at 329 (finding “massive judicial rejection of the present sense impression
exception”).
29. Jay Hoor, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993).
30. See James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case—Declarations as a Part of the Res Gestae,
15 AM. L. REV. 71 (1881) (arguing for an exception to the rule against hearsay for
declarations made contemporaneous with the fact under investigation).
31. Id. at 80–81.
32. Id. at 83.
33. Id. at 84–86.
34. Id. at 82–83.
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declarant is produced by a startling event that becomes the subject of
later litigation.35 Because the present sense impression may describe
more commonplace events as they unfold, the declarant may be
unlikely to recognize the potential importance of the event at the
time, further diminishing any incentive to deceive.36 Therefore,
Thayer proposed recognizing the present sense impression in
addition to the well-accepted excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule.37
Due to common communication methodology in the late
nineteenth century, Thayer’s formulation of the present sense
impression presupposed an oral hearsay statement regarding an
unfolding event.38 Accordingly, Thayer anticipated that present sense
impressions would be introduced at trial by a witness who had
overheard an oral present sense impression uttered by another.39 In
the typical case, a trial witness in a position to overhear an oral
description of an ongoing event would have had a similar
opportunity to observe the described event and be in a position to
corroborate the hearsay statement at trial.40 Later scholars favoring
adoption of the present sense impression similarly presumed that
such testimonial corroboration by a percipient witness would exist.41
Although Thayer recognized the likely presence of such
corroboration, he did not articulate “corroboration” of the statement
as an independent requirement for the admission of the present
sense impression.42 Because of Thayer’s significant influence, the
concept of the present sense impression enjoyed some acceptance

35. Id. at 105–06.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 82–83.
38. Id. at 83.
39. Id. at 107.
40. See id. at 107 (explaining that present sense impressions would describe
“what was then present or but just gone by, and so was open, either immediately or
in the indications of it, to the observation of the witness who testifies to the
declaration, and who can be cross-examined as to these indications”).
41. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928) (“With emotion absent, speed present,
and the person who heard the declaration on hand to be cross-examined, we appear
to have an ideal exception to the hearsay rule.”); Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested
Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236 (1922)
(explaining that “the event is open to perception by the senses of the person to
whom the declaration is made and by whom it is usually reported on the witness
stand” and that “[t]he witness is subject to cross-examination concerning that event
as well as the fact and content of the utterance, so that the extra-judicial statement
does not depend solely upon the credit of the declarant”).
42. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 354 (noting that early proponents of the
present sense impression assume the presence of corroboration by definition,
without advocating it as an independent requirement).
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among the judiciary during the late nineteenth century.43
“If Thayer was the . . . champion [of the present sense impression],
Wigmore was its nemesis.” 44 Thayer’s protégé, John Henry Wigmore,
assumed prominence for much of the twentieth century and his views
of the proper scope and focus of the hearsay doctrine soon
dominated the evidentiary sphere.45 In contrast to Thayer, Wigmore
emphasized the need for stress or excitement to create assurances of
According to Wigmore, present sense
declarant sincerity.46
impressions lacking elements of excitement were likewise lacking in
needed reliability.47 Wigmore, thus, steadfastly rejected a hearsay
exception for the present sense impression.48 Although many
academics continued to support Thayer’s approach to the exception,
courts creating the common law of evidence at the time followed
Wigmore’s approach and refused to recognize the present sense
impression.49
In this common law climate, the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence considered the fate of the present sense impression.50 By
the 1970s when the Advisory Committee was drafting the Federal
Rules of Evidence, research regarding testimonial accuracy and
memory had proliferated.51
Commentators were increasingly
concerned with the significant risks of failed memory and testimonial
error, in addition to risks of intentional insincerity.52 In keeping with
these contemporary concerns, the Advisory Committee went against

43. Id. at 327 (stating that “before Wigmore’s intervention, ‘[t]he exception to
the hearsay rule for spontaneous exclamations in the absence of a startling event
ha[d] been accepted by the courts fairly extensively when the statement relate[d] to
an event.’” (alteration in original)).
44. Id.
45. See id. (explaining that “Wigmore, ‘Thayer’s most distinguished disciple,’
enjoyed the greatest stature in the field” (citation omitted)).
46. See, 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1747, at
195 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (stating that “under certain external circumstances of
physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the
reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then
occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock”).
47. Id.
48. See id. § 1757, at 236.
49. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 41, at 432 (advocating adoption of a
present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule); Edmund M. Morgan, Res
Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91 (1937) (describing circumstances in which it is
appropriate to recognize a present sense impression, despite an inclination against
the exception).
50. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 329 (describing consideration of Rule 803(1)
against a “backdrop . . . of massive judicial rejection of the present sense impression
exception”).
51. Id. at 322–23.
52. Id. at 323.
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the grain of the common law and included the present sense
impression in the Federal Rules of Evidence.53 Although the
exception proved controversial, it was ultimately retained by Congress
and still enjoys its position as the first exception to the hearsay rule
appearing in Federal Rule of Evidence 803.54
C. E-hearsay: The Era of Facebook, Twitter, and the Text
Dramatic changes in available communication platforms as a result
of the technological revolution promise to have significant impact on
hearsay evidence. Over the past decade, technology has developed
methods of harnessing the power of the Internet in tiny hand-held
devices capable of following users anywhere and everywhere.55 As
technology has advanced, private enterprise has been prolific in the
creation of new platforms for communicating via the Internet.
Computer and smartphone users are now able to engage in an
infinite array of electronic activities—such as e-mailing, texting,
tweeting, posting status updates, playing games, locating businesses
or friends, or diagnosing illness — from anywhere in the world.56
Importantly, such technology has allowed users to remain constantly
connected to a network of designated friends and followers through
sites such as Facebook and Twitter.57
A social media community has arisen as a result of these new
platforms.
This community has developed a culture of
communication that is marked by a pervasive connection to one’s
network of on-line friends and the constant posting of updates,
observations and activities. Participation in this online community is
not limited to college students and teenagers. News outlets,
politicians, businesses, government entities, celebrities, and people of

53. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note.
54. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 329 (noting opposition by the American
Bar Association and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America to the initial
inclusion of the present sense impression in the Rules).
55. See Jenna Wortham, New Apps Connect to Friends Nearby, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
2012, at B1 (describing the near ubiquity of smartphones and the ease with which
users can correspond with friends given the meteoric rise of social networking via
mobile “apps”).
56. See, e.g., Apps that Let You Share Cars, Photos and Money, NPR (June 20, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/20/137058934/apps-that-let-you-share-cars-photosand-money (describing how “[s]martphone apps let us play games, count calories,
find cheap gas—just about anything developers can dream up”); Anushay Hossain,
Downloading Empowerment: Application Gives Citizens Control Over Crime, FORBES (Feb. 2,
2012, 12:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/worldviews/2012/02/01/
downloading-empowerment-application-gives-citizens-control-over-crime.
57. Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (March 2, 2011) (consent order); Key Facts,
FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last
visited June 9, 2012).

RICHTER.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

DON’T JUST DO SOMETHING!

8/27/2012 12:18 PM

1669

all ages are now plugged into the Facebook and Twitter communities
as a matter of course.58
The possibilities for the creation and preservation of e-hearsay
through these social media sites and other wireless capabilities are
obvious. Indeed, Professor Bellin has aptly noted that “Twitter could
be the brainchild of mischievous evidence scholars.” 59 One can
readily appreciate how tweets, texts, videos, and status updates may
contain hearsay statements describing events declarants are
experiencing as they type. Indeed, the on-line community that has
grown up around sites like Facebook and Twitter encourages and
feeds the practice of posting constant electronic assertions regarding
the daily activities and observations of users. Professor Bellin has
expressed concern that this plethora of information will flood into
the trial process through the present sense impression exception,
threatening its integrity with unreliable and self-serving statements
designed to entertain, spin, and socialize rather than to report
accurately.60 As a result, he claims that there is an urgent need to
amend the requirements of the present sense impression under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) to prevent such wholesale admission
of “tweets” and “status updates” and “texts” into American trials.61
He recommends the addition of a “percipient witness” requirement
to Rule 803(1) to foreclose the admissibility of uncorroborated ehearsay.62 Under this proposal, present sense impression evidence
could only be introduced at trial through a witness with personal
knowledge of the event or condition described by the hearsay
statement.63
Although wholesale admission of such social media e-hearsay into
the trial process would raise significant reliability concerns, the risk
that courts will permit such indiscriminate use of tweets and texts
under existing requirements of the present sense impression
exception appears minimal. Because Twitter encourages users to
answer the question “what’s happening?,” it is undoubtedly tailormade to elicit e-hearsay containing the subject matter covered by the
present sense impression. The subject matter requirement for the
admissibility of present sense impressions represents only one

58. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 336 n.16 (discussing a tweet by a celebrity claiming
to have raced with Justin Bieber shortly before Bieber collided with another vehicle);
Barack Obama, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/BarackObama.
59. Bellin, supra note 6, at 334.
60. See generally Bellin, supra note 6.
61. Id. at 366.
62. Id. at 370.
63. Id.
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requirement for admission, however. Trial judges must also ascertain
that the event or condition described by the statement occurred or
existed, that the declarant had personal knowledge of that event or
condition, and that the declarant made the assertion while perceiving
These
the event or condition or immediately thereafter.64
requirements will serve as important checks on the wholesale
admission of ubiquitous tweets, texts, and status updates.
D. The Present Sense Impression: Crossing the E-hearsay Frontier
1.

Human ingenuity and evolving methods of communication
There are many reasons to expect that trial and appellate courts
will police e-hearsay effectively under existing requirements of the
present sense impression. Most importantly, although social media
and other e-hearsay may employ cutting-edge vernacular and
originate from new locations, it remains human communication.
Where the only change
involves norms of communication
methodology, existing hearsay rules are sufficient to regulate this
form of human expression with all of its nuances and peculiarities.
Trial judges have ample experience in adapting the requirements of
the present sense impression exception, as well as other hearsay
exceptions, to all forms of human communication.65 This experience
will allow courts to respond appropriately to the latest modification in
the format of human communication —social media and other ehearsay. Indeed, throughout the history of the hearsay doctrine,
technology has constantly pushed human communication into new
formats, requiring consideration by the courts.
Although communication norms at the time of Thayer’s
scholarship may have contemplated oral communication of a present
sense impression to a percipient witness in the usual case, methods of
human communication are inherently variable and defy precise
prediction regardless of the era.
Common methods of
communication at the time of Thayer’s work also raised the
possibility of present sense impressions without a percipient
corroborating witness. In the famous case of Regina v. Bedingfield,66
which spurred Thayer’s three-part essay on res gestae, Mrs. Rudd
allegedly alighted from her bedroom with her throat cut and
exclaimed: “Oh, aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to me.” 67
64. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
65. See infra notes 105–09 (discussing application of hearsay doctrine to various
forms of human communication prior to the Internet).
66. 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct. 1879).
67. Orenstein, supra note 16, at 116.
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Bedingfield was found in the bedroom with a shallow cut in his throat
from which he recovered.68 Although Bedingfield was quickly tried
and hanged for Mrs. Rudd’s murder, scholars decried the trial court’s
rejection of Mrs. Rudd’s statement, noting the closeness in time
between the event and the speech, the startling nature of the attack,
the independent evidence suggesting that the event occurred, and
Mrs. Rudd’s personal knowledge of what had transpired in her
room.69 In this context, the victim’s statement appears to meet the
timing requirement of the present sense impression.70 Because of the
slight lapse in time permitted by the rule, as recognized by Thayer,
the hearsay exception is capable of allowing a present sense
impression made to a testifying witness who was not a witness to the
underlying events at issue.71 Even before advances in communication
technology, therefore, an oral present sense impression without a
percipient witness was not impossible or even unlikely.72
Furthermore, written communication was obviously common at the
time of Thayer’s work. The availability of written documentation
creates another potential method for remote communication of
present sense impressions. A nineteenth century businessman could
easily have taken contemporaneous notes of a closed-door meeting
and handed them to his assistant outside the door at the conclusion
of the meeting. While the assistant could authenticate the notes and
provide proof of the meeting, the timing of the notes, and the
author’s personal knowledge of the event, the assistant, who did not
attend the meeting, would not constitute a percipient witness capable
of corroborating events at the meeting.73 Even in Thayer’s era,
therefore, one could not universally assume an oral present sense
impression to another percipient witness.
Of course, technology has fundamentally altered the methods and
speed of human communication. This communication revolution
68. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. at 342.
69. Orenstein, supra note 16, at 117 (noting the firestorm of criticism generated
by the trial court’s decision to exclude the alleged statement).
70. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
71. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note (observing that a “slight
lapse” between perception and speech is allowable).
72. Oral present sense impressions to a close witness who lacks personal
knowledge of underlying events continue to appear even under modern
communication norms. See United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.
2005) (affirming use of present sense impression exception to allow immediate oral
explanation of conversation to fellow store employee too far away to overhear
conversation for herself).
73. See United States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (allowing
admission of handwritten notes of conversation as present sense impression); United
States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 97–98 (D. Mass. 1997) (allowing contemporaneous
handwritten meeting notes into evidence through present sense impression).
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did not begin with Internet or wireless connectivity, however.
Remote communication technology started more slowly: “[r]apid
signaling at a distance began with hand signs, smoke signals, flags,
drumbeats, hornblowing, flashing mirrors and lanterns, cannon
shots, beacons, carrier pigeons, and signaling positions (semaphores)
of various kinds.” 74 Samuel F. Morse developed the idea of using
short and long impulses corresponding to letters of the alphabet and
patented his system in 1837.75 With the arrival of the telegraph, it
became possible for one person to communicate remotely with
another about ongoing events as a routine matter.76 Indeed, the
telegraph was frequently used, much as social media is today, to make
others far away aware of local events or conditions.77 The telegraph’s
resemblance to the modern use of abbreviated text messages sent
from remote locations is powerful, thus illustrating that existing
hearsay doctrine was designed to handle the fundamental and
longstanding reality of remote human communication.
Further, Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876,
and long-distance service between New York and Chicago opened in
1892.78 With the advent of this technology, human communication
was forever transformed, allowing instantaneous transmission of
human assertions to remote locations. Akin to current social media
and other Internet capabilities, the telephone became widely
available and utilized routinely by people around the world.79
Importantly, although the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
clearly relied upon the research of Thayer and Morgan in
recognizing the present sense impression, they were drafting in the
early 1970s—a full century after development of telephone
technology.80 At this time in our technological evolution, telephones
were a common part of daily existence, thus expanding the potential
contexts in which a present sense impression could be made beyond
74. George Gerbner, Communications, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 423, 425
(Int’l ed. 1979).
75. Id.
76. See id. (noting that telegraphy, “introduced in 1844, was a vital step on the
road to instantaneous, worldwide communication”).
77. See SAMUEL F. B. MORSE, EXAMINATION OF THE TELEGRAPHIC APPARATUS AND THE
PROCESSES IN TELEGRAPHY 16 (1869) (describing the telegraph as a means of
communicating from a distance and distinguishing it from other forms of
communication that existed at the time).
78. Gerbner, supra note 74.
79. Id.
80. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note (demonstrating the
influence past scholarship had on adopting the exception); see also Morgan, supra
note 49, at 91 (promoting the addition of a present sense impression exception);
Thayer, supra note 30, at 71 (introducing the argument for the present sense
exception).
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the face-to-face oral assertion to a percipient witness. Surely, the
drafters of original Rule 803(1) were aware of and contemplated this
not-esoteric probability.81 Nonetheless, the drafters of the original
Federal Rules of Evidence did not limit the admission of present
sense impressions to those related by other percipient witnesses.82
Because remote human communication that characterizes social
media e-hearsay was prevalent when the present sense impression
exception was originally recognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the proliferation of social media e-hearsay does not raise a new and
different set of hearsay concerns necessitating a new and different
type of regulation.
Finally, courts have successfully applied existing hearsay doctrine to
e-mail communications for many years.83 The ability to make
instantaneous electronic assertions to remote witnesses about events
those witnesses cannot perceive or corroborate is nothing new. The
social media and text message revolution is simply an extension of
the e-mail capabilities routinely available since the early 1990s. With
a hand-held device, one can, in essence, keep a computer in a pocket
to send an e-mail or text from anywhere. With Facebook and Twitter,
one can broadcast an assertion to a wider audience more readily.
Still, the fact remains that these are simply human assertions made to
others at remote locations. To be sure, Twitter’s question “what’s
happening?” and Facebook’s encouragement of the “status update”
may be spurring the creation of more potential present sense
impressions.
Still, those tweets and updates remain human
communication to a remote audience that courts and lawyers have
handled under existing rules for over 20 years.84 Although the latest
81. Indeed, even pre-Rules cases used a common law precursor to the present
sense impression exception to allow hearsay statements describing remote telephone
conversations. See Nuttall v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 551–52 (3d Cir. 1956)
(allowing wife to testify to deceased husband’s hearsay statements describing
telephone call with his employer immediately after call ended).
82. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (requiring only that the statement describing an
event be made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it).
83. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 554 (D. Md. 2007) (“[E]mail evidence often figures prominently in cases where state of mind, motive, and
intent must be proved. Indeed, it is not unusual to see a case consisting almost
entirely of e-mail evidence.”); United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 99 (D. Mass.
1997) (evaluating and allowing e-mail message as a present sense impression).
84. Indeed, courts have rejected the notion that new and improved evidentiary
rules are necessary to deal with electronic communication:
[E]ssentially, appellant would have us create a whole new body of law just to
deal with e-mails or instant messages. The argument is that e-mails or text
messages are inherently unreliable because of their relative anonymity and
the fact that [they] . . . can rarely be connected to a specific author with any
certainty . . . . However, the same uncertainties exist with traditional written
documents. A signature can be forged; a letter can by typed on another’s
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technological innovations may provide a convenient platform for rearguing the merits of the present sense impression, the recent
change in the quantity and format of human communications leaves
the fundamental substantive issues raised by the exception
unaltered.85 So long as e-hearsay remains human communication,
trial and appellate courts are well-equipped to deal with the hearsay
challenges it brings using existing doctrine.
2.

Limits on the e-present sense impression
Despite the novel format of e-hearsay assertions, the existing
requirements of the present sense impression exception remain more
than adequate to deal with the reliability concerns they present. Trial
courts evaluating e-hearsay in the form of texts, tweets, or status
updates under the current present sense impression exception must
determine that the statements were made contemporaneously with
the declarant’s personal observation of the underlying events or
conditions.86 Because Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) authorizes the
trial judge to assess the preliminary requirements of hearsay
exceptions unrestrained by the rules of evidence, a trial judge may
use the purported e-present sense impression evidence itself to
demonstrate the occurrence of the event, declarant’s personal
knowledge of it, and the timing of the statement.87
In theory, therefore, an e-hearsay statement could appear to satisfy
the requirements for its own admission under Rule 803(1) on its face.
To illustrate this concern about e-hearsay and the present sense
impression, Professor Bellin creates a fun and fictional tweet:
[@]Lord Cobham 5 minutes ago
Talking treason over beers with @SirWalter, don’t tell the King!
☺88

He asks “what proof is this? Indeed.” 89 This clever hypothetical
suggests that this tweet alone could satisfy the requirements of Rule
803(1) because it purports to relate an ongoing event personally
typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary [sic] can be copied or stolen.
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 543.
85. See id. at 538 n.5 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 102 “contemplates
that the rules of evidence are flexible enough to accommodate future ‘growth and
development’ to address technical changes not in existence as of the codification of
the rules themselves”).
86. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
87. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (providing that a trial judge is “not bound by
evidence rules, except those on privilege” in deciding preliminary questions of
admissibility); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987).
88. Bellin, supra note 6, at 336.
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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observed by Lord Cobham and that Sir Walter Raleigh could be
convicted in the American trial system on the basis of such
questionable e-hearsay.90 Putting aside for a moment whether the
tweet could satisfy the requirements of the present sense impression
exception by itself, it is important to keep in mind that this tweet,
even if it were admissible, would be inadequate to support an
indictment for treason, let alone a conviction.91 Rule 803(1) governs
the admissibility and not the sufficiency of trial evidence.92 Without
additional evidence, such as damning texts and tweets from Sir
Walter Raleigh’s own accounts and observations of Sir Walter with
known enemies of the State engaged in malfeasance, a treason
conviction is nothing more than whimsical fiction.93 Side-by-side with
other damning bits of evidence, however, Lord Cobham’s tweet could
potentially be admitted to assist the jury in resolving the disputed
question of Sir Walter Raleigh’s loyalty. This important reality
eliminates any genuine danger of criminal convictions premised
solely on uncorroborated Twitter present sense impressions.
Exploring whether e-hearsay will support its own admissibility as a
present sense impression, imagine the following more commonplace
tweet:
@Passenger 2 minutes ago
Drinking beers with Driver in his ride on the way home-cheers!94

This tweet suggests an event: That Driver and Passenger are in a
vehicle heading home. It also indicates that Passenger is in the car
with Driver and has personal knowledge of Driver’s conduct in the
car. It then describes Driver’s drinking conduct in a manner that
suggests that the tweet and Passenger’s perception of Driver are
occurring simultaneously. Therefore, the tweet itself may purport to
satisfy all the requisites for admission of a present sense impression.

90. Id. at 335.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006) (“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States,
levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort
within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason . . . .”).
92. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175 (“The [Rule 104(a)] inquiry . . . is not whether
the proponent of the evidence wins or loses his case on the merits, but whether the
evidentiary rules have been satisfied.”); People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 911
(Mich. 1998) (Boyle, J., concurring) (“The role of the Rule 104(a) determination is
not to determine the defendant’s guilt; rather, the purpose is merely to determine
whether the preliminary fact has been established by a preponderance of the
evidence.”).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006).
94. Tweets describing such driving conduct appear commonplace in the world of
social media. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 336 n.16 (describing the tweet of a celebrity
describing an automobile collision involving Justin Bieber).
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If this hypothetical tweet can satisfy the requirements for its own
admission, Driver might legitimately complain about the reliability of
the information used to implicate him.
As noted by the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 803, this
concern is largely academic.95 Rarely will a proponent of a present
sense impression need to rely exclusively on the hearsay statement
itself to prove the threshold requirements for its admissibility.96 In
the typical case in which subsequent events have transformed a
mundane present sense impression into important evidence, there
will almost always be ample information available to evaluate the
threshold requirements of the exception, apart from the statement
itself.97 For example, in a wrongful death case arising out of Driver’s
collision with another vehicle, the plaintiff would undoubtedly wish
to admit Passenger’s tweet to prove Driver’s intoxication at the time
of the accident. Where plaintiff can identify Passenger as a person
riding in Driver’s car at the time of the collision, plaintiff can
demonstrate Passenger’s ability to perceive Driver’s conduct. Even
evidence that Driver and Passenger were seen together at some point
close to the time of the collision would tend to support Passenger’s
personal observation of Driver’s conduct. Geolocation features on
Twitter and Facebook could potentially even assist in placing
Passenger in the vicinity of the collision at the time of the tweet.98 In
addition, a comparison between the time of the tweet and the time of
the collision could demonstrate that the tweet was posted while
Driver was on his way home, thus suggesting contemporaneous
speech and observation. Finally, evidence that Passenger used the
Twitter handle @Passenger and that he had a wireless device capable
of tweeting in the car or that he commonly carried one, could serve
to authenticate the tweet as Passenger’s.99 Thus, there is likely to be
some circumstantial evidence, apart from the present sense
impression itself, suggesting the threshold requirements of
contemporaneous personal observation by the declarant once

95. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
96. See id. (providing that in most cases there is at least some circumstantial
evidence).
97. Id.
98. See David Ionescu, Facebook, Twitter Ready Location-Based Features, PCWORLD
(Mar. 10, 2010, 5:10 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/191151/
facebook_twitter_ready_locationbased-features.html (noting how Facebook and
Twitter are among the increasing number of social networks integrating geolocation
capabilities).
99. FED. R. EVID. 901 (delineating the requirement for authentication of evidence
that “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is”).
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litigation arises.
Although Rule 803(1) does not demand it, there often will be some
extrinsic evidence that actually corroborates the content of
declarant’s present sense impression as well. In the wrongful death
case, the subsequent collision, of course, provides some independent
corroboration that something was amiss with one of the drivers
involved. Further, there may even be additional evidence to
corroborate Passenger’s Twitter present-sense impression, such as
beers found at the scene, Driver’s inebriated demeanor, or Driver’s
blood alcohol level after the collision. Therefore, when a lawsuit has
arisen out of events related to a present sense impression and that
lawsuit is sufficiently meritorious to reach the trial stage, the absence
of any independent evidence supporting the requirements for
admission of a relevant present sense impression is highly unlikely.
This reality notwithstanding, the theoretical possibility of admitting
tweets like Passenger’s, that are wholly uncorroborated, remains if
one looks solely to Rule 803(1) because the Rule does not demand
independent evidence to satisfy its threshold requirements.100 It is
this theoretical possibility that gives critics of the present sense
impression exception pause.101 This concern, however, is merely old
wine poured into the contemporary carafe of e-hearsay. Allowing
hearsay statements to lift themselves by their own “bootstraps” to
satisfy the requirements of a hearsay exception was long prohibited
under the common law of evidence as it existed before the Federal
Rules.102
In United States v. Bourjaily, a case involving the
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the Supreme Court
found that the Federal Rules of Evidence reversed the common law
prohibition on “bootstrapping” through Rule 104(a), which
authorizes a trial judge to decide preliminary questions of
admissibility unrestrained by evidentiary rules.103 Where a proffered
hearsay statement itself is merely one item of information available
for the trial judge to consider in evaluating the admissibility of
hearsay, the Supreme Court held that Rule 104(a) expressly
authorizes its use.104 The Court declined to decide whether a trial
court must also find independent evidence apart from the hearsay
100. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
101. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 335 (describing the potential for abuse of the
present sense impression exception).
102. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S 171, 177 (1987) (noting that the Courts of
Appeal had widely held that “in determining the preliminary facts relevant to coconspirators’ out-of-court statements, a court may not look at the hearsay statements
themselves for their evidentiary value”).
103. Id. at 177–78.
104. Id. at 178–79.
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statement to support its admissibility because ample independent
evidence existed on the facts of Bourjaily.105 Therefore, consistent
with Bourjaily and Rule 104(a), trial judges may undoubtedly utilize a
proffered text or tweet itself to satisfy the requirements of the present
sense impression exception.106
Merely considering the content of the e-hearsay itself is not
problematic from a reliability standpoint. Rather, it is the use of the
proffered e-present sense impression evidence alone to prove its own
admissibility that raises reliability concerns. While there is nothing
within the text of Rule 803(1) that prohibits a trial judge from
utilizing the present sense impression alone to satisfy its
requirements, a more holistic evaluation of the Federal Rules
framework suggests that trial judges will look for some independent
evidence to satisfy the requirements of the present sense impression
before admitting e-hearsay into evidence. Thus, even under the
current requirements of Rule 803(1), trial judges do not admit
present sense impressions like Passenger’s tweet without some
independent evidence suggesting Passenger’s personal knowledge of
underlying events and the timing of his tweet.
First, the burden of proof applicable to a trial judge’s preliminary
findings counsels against use of a proffered hearsay statement alone
to establish the requirements for its own admissibility.107 The
Supreme Court has held that a trial judge must make Rule 104(a)
preliminary findings by a preponderance of the evidence.108 If a
tweet like Passenger’s were the only evidence available to suggest that
Passenger had personal knowledge of Driver’s conduct and was
tweeting as he observed it, the tweet alone would appear to be
inadequate to fulfill even a preponderance standard. Without
witnesses or other information suggesting the occurrence of the
described event, declarant’s personal knowledge of it, and the timing
of the statement, a trial judge would be unable to find it “more likely
than not” that declarant described the event while perceiving it.
Therefore, the standard of proof applicable to preliminary findings
should prevent pure “bootstrapping” in the e-present sense
impression context.
Second, the co-conspirator exception in the Federal Rules of
Evidence was amended following the Supreme Court’s decision in

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 181.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 175–76.
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Bourjaily.109 This amendment requires at least some independent
evidence apart from the proffered hearsay statement itself to satisfy
the standards for admitting a co-conspirator hearsay statement.110 It
provides that a trial court “must” consider the hearsay statement, but
cautions that the proffered hearsay statement “does not by itself
establish” the requirements for admissibility.111 Thus, this provision
of the Rules rejects pure “bootstrapping” in the context of the coconspirator exception.
This concern over “bootstrapping” is not unique to the coconspirator exception and indeed arises whenever a hearsay
exception requires the existence of a certain relationship, type of
event, or other factual condition precedent to admissibility.112 The
present sense impression, with its timing and personal knowledge
requirements, presents similar concerns over “bootstrapping” and
independent evidence.113 Allowing Passenger’s tweet alone to satisfy
the requirements for its own admissibility as a present sense
impression is simply an example of pure “bootstrapping” in the Rule
803 context.114 By amending the co-conspirator exception in 1997,
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence clearly signaled that trial
judges must look for some independent evidence to support the
existence of a conspiracy between a declarant and a party before
admitting that declarant’s hearsay statement against the party.115
This independent evidence requirement should apply equally to
present sense impressions in light of the similar purpose served by
threshold requirements enumerated under the co-conspirator
exception and Rule 803.116 Within the context of the co-conspirator

109. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.
110. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
111. Id. (extending the independent evidence requirement to declarant’s
speaking authority or the declarant’s employment relationship for purposes of
admissions by speaking agents and other employees as well).
112. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 844 (4th ed.
2009) (noting similar issues in context of excited utterance exception).
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“[O]n occasion the
only evidence may be the content of the statement itself . . . .”).
115. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note (noting that “the contents
of the declarant’s statement do not alone suffice to establish a conspiracy in which
the declarant and the defendant participated”).
116. From the standpoint of statutory construction, one could argue that the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence intended no independent evidence
requirement for exceptions like the present sense impression and the excited
utterance where the Rules fail to include any such express requirement. See People v.
Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 911 (Mich. 1998) (Boyle, J., concurring) (“[I]n stark
contrast to the explicit language contained in [Rule] 801(d)(2)(E) and 804(b)(3),
the requirement of extrinsic corroboration is clearly and conspicuously absent from
the language of the rule [803] itself or the requisite elements.”).
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exception, it is deemed unfair to introduce the hearsay statements of
a declarant against a party absent some independent proof of the
Hence,
requisite co-conspirator relationship between them.117
independent evidence of the co-conspirator relationship is needed to
trigger the justification for admitting the hearsay. In the context of
the present sense impression, the hearsay statement is not deemed
sufficiently reliable absent a showing that the declarant had personal
knowledge of an event and spoke as she observed it.118 Hence, like
the co-conspirator relationship requirement within the coconspirator exception, these threshold factual findings are also
necessary to trigger the justification for admitting these hearsay
statements. Where the purpose of the preliminary requirements is
the same, both should require the same method of proof with some
information independent of the hearsay statement.119 Indeed, there
appears to be no logical counterargument in favor of pure
“bootstrapping.” 120
Therefore, a rational examination of the
requirements for admitting hearsay evidence counsels against the
admission of tweets like Passenger’s, without independent
information supporting the threshold requirements for its
admissibility.121
117. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note (“Admissions by a party
opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their
admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction
of the conditions of the hearsay rule.”).
118. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“The present rule proceeds
upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may
possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify
nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be
available.”).
119. See United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 207 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “first principles demand that the excited utterance itself
cannot constitute the only evidence of a startling event”).
120. See id. at 209 (“Although some of these authorities claim that admitting such
statements is the ‘generally prevailing rule,’ they neither cite recent authority nor
provide explanations of why such circular reasoning is permissible.” (citation
omitted)); State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that none
of the commentators, suggesting that a hearsay statement alone can prove its
admissibility, “explain with any detail the reasoning for their position”).
121. The principal support for “bootstrapping” in the Rule 803 context appears
to come from the original Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 803. See FED R. EVID.
803 advisory committee’s note (explaining that a declarant’s personal knowledge
“may appear from his statement or be inferable from the circumstances” and that
cases allowing use of a hearsay statement alone to prove the startling event for
purposes of the excited utterance exception are “increasing”). Many treatises parrot
the Advisory Committee statement that bootstrapping is the prevailing view.
Contemporary cases and treatises suggest a more thoughtful approach following
Bourjaily. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272, at 257 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006) (“The issue [of whether a hearsay statement alone can prove a startling event]
has not yet been resolved under the Federal Rules.”). Even the original Advisory
Committee notes recognized judicial reluctance to allow the hearsay statement of an
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Furthermore, the trial courts policing the application of the
present sense impression in the era of e-hearsay are likely to follow
this approach. Given the common law rejection of any use of a
hearsay statement in deciding its own admissibility, trial judges are
unlikely to adopt the opposite approach and routinely allow hearsay
statements alone to prove the requirements for their own
admissibility.122 If anything, courts are likely to retain some of their
pre-Bourjaily aversion to utilizing the hearsay statement at all.123
Indeed, after the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide
whether trial courts must find independent evidence in Bourjaily,
every federal court of appeals confronting the issue required “some
evidence in addition to the contents of the statement.” 124
Cases reviewing admissibility of hearsay through the Rule 803
exceptions illustrate this insistence upon independent evidence.
First, the vast majority of cases examining the present sense
impression and excited utterance exceptions, where the concern over
independent evidence is especially salient, do not consider the
question of “bootstrapping” and the need for independent evidence
at all. The reason for this, as discussed above in connection with
Passenger’s hypothetical tweet, is that there is typically ample
independent information to support the threshold requirements of
these hearsay exceptions and courts need not expressly consider
whether information independent of the hearsay statement is
required to support its admissibility. Where independent evidence is
available, the question of “bootstrapping” is moot because the
hearsay exception is satisfied regardless of the approach adopted.
Thus, the issue of bootstrapping remains “largely academic” in the
vast majority of cases.125
“unidentified bystander” alone to prove declarant’s perception of underlying events
for purposes of the present sense impression. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s
note.
122. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 177 (1987) (noting the common
law rejection of “bootstrapping” approach to the admission of hearsay).
123. See People v. Barrett, 747 N.W.2d 797, 803–04 (Mich. 2008) (adopting
Bourjaily, over twenty years after the decision was rendered, and permitting use of the
hearsay statement in evaluating its admissibility for the first time).
124. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.
125. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) and (2) advisory committee’s note (“Whether proof of the
startling event may be made by the statement itself is largely an academic question,
since in most cases, there is present at least circumstantial evidence that something
of a startling nature must have occurred.”); see also United States v. Woodfolk, 656
A.2d 1145, 1150 (D.C. 1995) (“[O]nly in the unusual case will there be a complete
lack of evidence, direct or circumstantial, to indicate whether an event has occurred
that could account for the excitedness of the utterance.”); 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 121, § 272, at 217–18 (“Fortunately, only a very few cases need
actually confront this knotty theoretical problem if the courts view the independent
evidence concept broadly, as they should where the circumstances and content of
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Moreover, the federal and state decisions that have specifically
addressed the issue of “bootstrapping” confirm judicial insistence on
some independent evidence in the context of Rule 803 exceptions.
While most of the decisions squarely addressing this issue involve the
excited utterance exception and the need for independent
information to prove a “startling event,” the underlying analysis
remains pertinent for the present sense impression.126 The vast
majority of courts require at least some evidence independent of the
hearsay statement under consideration itself, to support a finding of
admissibility under the Rule 803 exceptions and their state
counterparts.127 While the decisions vary with respect to the amount
of independent evidence required, they agree that a Rule 803 hearsay
statement alone should not establish its own admissibility.128
the statement indicate trustworthiness.”).
126. See People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Mich. 1998) (“Given the
analytical similarity between the present sense impression and excited utterance
exceptions, we conclude that their independent evidence requirements are similarly
analogous.”).
127. See United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 209 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (“Reaching the same conclusion that I have, various courts have held
that a hearsay statement itself cannot serve as the sole evidence of the alleged
startling event that spurred the statement.”); United States v. McCullough, 150 F.
App’x 507, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “an excited utterance can not
establish its own underlying event”); United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d
Cir. 1998) (deciding that an anonymous note failed to satisfy personal knowledge
requirement for admission as a present sense impression or excited utterance “given
the total lack of information regarding the circumstances of the note’s creation”);
Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511–12 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding the record “empty”
of any circumstances from which the trial court could have inferred by a
preponderance that the declarant saw the defendant cut in); Woodfolk, 656 A.2d at
1150 (“We may assume . . . that the mere making of the statement itself cannot alone
serve as sufficient evidence of the occurrence of a startling event.”); People v.
Leonard, 400 N.E.2d 568, 572–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (finding a hearsay statement
was erroneously admitted as excited utterance without any independent evidence
besides statement itself to establish startling event); Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d at 910
(requiring extrinsic corroboration of the present sense impression); State v. Kemp,
919 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that there must be at least some
evidence of the basic event, independent of the declaration that accompanies it, in
order for hearsay to be admitted as an excited utterance); State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d
231, 234–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that when determining whether to admit
hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the
sound approach is to require some independent proof that the event giving rise to
the utterance could have occurred); People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 374 (N.Y.
1993) (“[B]efore present sense impression testimony is received there must be some
evidence in addition to the statements themselves to assure the court that the
statements . . . were made spontaneously and contemporaneously with the events
described.”); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 456 A.2d 1037, 1040 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(noting that an excited utterance cannot be admitted where there is no independent
evidence that a startling event has occurred); State v. Young, 161 P.3d 967, 973–74
(Wash. 2007) (en banc) (finding that declarant’s statement alone is insufficient to
corroborate the occurrence of the startling event, but that circumstantial evidence,
independent of the bare words can corroborate that a startling event occurred).
128. See McCullough, 150 F. App’x. at 509–10 (noting that “an excited utterance
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Therefore, the courts specifically examining this issue reject pure
“bootstrapping” under Rule 803.129 Consistent with this judicial
trend, courts can be expected to seek some independent evidence
beyond a proffered text or tweet to establish declarant’s personal
observation of the events described and his contemporaneous
assertion in applying the present sense impression to e-hearsay.130
Therefore, although reference to the language of Rule 803(1)
alone might suggest that a tweet could prove its own admissibility
through the present sense impression exception, a more holistic view
of the Federal Rules of Evidence framework, applying contemporary
precedent and evidentiary policies, reveals the need for some
information apart from the e-hearsay itself to support admissibility.
That said, the rules do not demand a specific form or type of
information to fulfill this role. Purely circumstantial evidence
suggesting declarant’s perception and the timing of the hearsay may
serve this purpose. Nor do the rules require extrinsic evidence
corroborating the content of the hearsay statement.131 So long as
there is sufficient information supporting declarant’s ability to
perceive and his contemporaneous speech, independent verification
cannot establish its own underlying event”). Compare Young, 161 P.3d at 973–74
(allowing circumstantial evidence to suggest “startling event” for purposes of excited
utterance exception), with Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d at 910 (requiring proof
completely independent of present sense impression to prove observed event).
129. Some courts that recognize the “bootstrapping” concerns inherent in the
application of Rule 803 exceptions sidestep a holding regarding an independent
evidence requirement by finding ample independent evidence to satisfy Rule
104(a)’s preponderance standard in the particular case. See Arnold, 486 F.3d at 185
(confronting the issue of whether the “uncorroborated content of an excited
utterance should . . . be permitted by itself to establish the startling nature of the
event” and finding that the issue “need not detain” it where “considerable nonhearsay evidence corroborated the anxiety-inducing nature of this event”).
130. A few courts have purported to allow use of the hearsay statement alone to
prove the requirements for Rule 803 exceptions. United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d
454, 459 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that “the declaration itself may establish that a
startling event occurred” (citing United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570–71 (7th
Cir. 1986))). Notably, Brown and Moore offer no rationale for allowing a hearsay
statement alone to support its own admissibility. Id. Further, when these cases are
examined closely, they reveal independent information beyond the hearsay
statement itself to support the requirements for the applicable Rule 803 exception.
See id. at 461 (addressing defendant’s argument that the government carried a
“heavier burden” with respect to hearsay statements of anonymous bystanders and
emphasizing the testimony of the arresting officer that he “almost immediately came
upon Brown, who was visibly carrying a gun” and that he personally observed
declarants “yelling,” “very excited,” “very nervous,” and “hopping around”); see also
Arnold, 486 F.3d at 209 n.6 (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the cases cited in
support of “bootstrapping” often involve independent evidence).
131. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
the federal rule does not require corroboration); Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at
351–52 (opining that an independent corroboration requirement is “virtually
impossible to rationalize as a matter of statutory construction” and that courts
adding such a requirement are engaged in “unwarranted judicial legislation”).
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of declarant’s version of events is unnecessary.132 The Rules certainly
do not demand a percipient witness to corroborate the threshold
event, declarant’s observation of it, and the substance of declarant’s
hearsay statement.133
The proliferation of e-hearsay does not justify abandoning this
methodology for evaluating the admissibility of the present sense
impression. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the clear policy
underlying Rule 104(a) to add a rigid percipient witness
requirement.134 The Federal Rules are designed to allow the trial
judge flexibility and discretion in the type and quantum of
information needed to satisfy preliminary admissibility requirements.
Utilizing the existing standards within the Federal Rules of Evidence
framework, trial judges will have ample ammunition to prevent
questionable tweets, texts, and status updates from flowing freely into
the trial process. Tweets, like Passenger’s in the foregoing example,
will not be admitted as proof of disputed issues like Driver’s
consumption of alcohol on the road, absent at least some
circumstantial evidence apart from the e-hearsay to suggest
Passenger’s personal knowledge and contemporaneous tweeting.
Finally, unlike oral present sense impressions repeated by live
witnesses, e-hearsay will have to be authenticated pursuant to Article
9 of the Federal Rules before being admitted into evidence.135
Litigants will be required to offer sufficient “foundation from which
the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is what the
proponent says it is.” 136 Before a text message, tweet, or status update
may be admitted, therefore, courts will have to find sufficient
evidence from which the jury can ascertain that the e-hearsay actually
originated from the purported declarant.137 Indeed, “courts have
132. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 351 (noting that “[t]he text of the rule does
not even hint at a general requirement for corroboration”).
133. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
134. See People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 914 n.19 (Mich. 1998) (Boyle, J.,
concurring) (“The effort by my colleague to impose by judicial fiat an extrinsic
evidence requirement on hearsay exceptions in direct contravention of the clear and
unambiguous language of [Rule] 104(a) is based primarily on distrust of the factfinder and the trial court judge, rather than any deficit in the rule itself.”).
135. FED. R. EVID. 901; see also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 541
(D. Md. 2007) (“In order for [electronically stored information] to be admissible, it
also must be shown to be authentic.”).
136. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006).
137. See United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001)
(analyzing admissibility of printouts of computerized records); United States v.
Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2000) (authenticating e-mail with
circumstantial evidence); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000)
(analyzing admissibility of exhibits reflecting chat room conversations); United States
v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1998) (evaluating methods for
authenticating a printout of a chat room discussion).
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recognized that authentication of [electronically stored information
(“ESI”)] may require greater scrutiny than that required for the
authentication of ‘hard-copy’ documents.” 138 Trial judges may
require witnesses to establish the declarant’s past practices with
respect to e-hearsay, the location of the equipment used to post or
send the electronic message, the declarant’s access to the equipment
at the relevant time, and the access of anyone else at the relevant
time, among other factors.139 Unless a reasonable jury could
determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the e-present
sense impression came from the declarant, it will not be admitted.140
Failure to produce witnesses or other information capable of
adequately authenticating e-hearsay will also serve as an impediment
to the free flow of e-present sense impressions into the trial process.141
Therefore, existing evidentiary requirements applicable to the
present sense impression can be expected to control the admission of
unreliable e-hearsay.
3.

A cautious judicial approach to present sense impressions
Not only are the existing requirements of the present sense
impression exception adequate to exclude unreliable e-hearsay, trial
and appellate judges can be expected to apply those requirements

138. Lorraine, 241 F.3d at 542–43.
139. See, e.g., State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (noting
that testimony of victim’s friend established that text message came from victim’s cell
phone, that cell phone was found with body, that there was no evidence that anyone
other than the victim had access to that phone at the relevant time according to
defendant’s version of events); Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2007) (stating that evidence showing that a text message was sent from a phone in
defendant’s possession and contained facts known only by defendant served to
authenticate text).
140. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a
fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does
exist.”). Authentication is an issue of conditional relevance to which 104(b) applies.
The Supreme Court has held that a preponderance of the evidence standard applies
to 104(b) findings. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining how proponent failed to authenticate exhibits taken from an
organization’s website); In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 444–47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2005) (detailing the various criteria for properly authenticating exhibits of
electronically stored business records and holding that the proponent failed to meet
these requirements through either witness testimony or other corroborating
evidence); St. Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, NO. 8:06-CV-223-TMSS, 2006 WL 1320242, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006) (excluding exhibits showing
content of web pages where affidavits used to authenticate exhibits were factually
inaccurate and affiants lacked personal knowledge); Rambus v. Infineon Techs. AG,
348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 707 (E.D. Va. 2004) (showing that proponent inadequately
authenticated computerized business records); Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 423–24,
428 (Md. 2011) (holding state’s failure to properly authenticate pages allegedly
printed from victim’s profile on a social media website was reversible error).
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cautiously and narrowly to e-hearsay if history is any guide. Despite
gaining recognition in the Federal Rules, the present sense
impression traditionally has encountered obstacles in the
courtroom.142 Courts have applied the existing requirements of the
exception sparingly and strictly, and many have resisted application
of the present sense impression by erecting additional common law
barriers to admission outside the rules framework.143 Indeed,
commentators have noted that the present sense impression “has not
proved useful as anticipated” due to judicial circumspection in its
application.144 Where history suggests that trial and appellate courts
already carefully scrutinize present sense impressions before allowing
them into evidence, there appears to be no urgent need for revision
of Rule 803(1).
As any evidence student worth her salt will tell you, timing is the key
to the present sense impression.145 Because concerns over declarant
memory and deceit regarding an event are significantly minimized
only when declarant speaks as she observes, courts have carefully
policed the timing requirement of the exception.146 Consistent with
the policy behind the exception, many courts require
contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous speech in order to
admit hearsay through Rule 803(1).147 Even courts that allow a
“slight lapse” of time between the event and the assertion have
rejected statements made more than a few minutes afterward.148
142. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 325 (describing “courts’ conservatism in
applying the present sense impression exception”).
143. See id. at 333–42 (identifying six different “judicial gloss[es]” placed upon
the present sense impression by courts).
144. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:67, at 561; see also Imwinkelried,
supra, note 10, at 343 (noting that “[t]he courts have severely cramped Rule 803(1)
by adding one restriction after another to the statute’s scope”).
145. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:67, at 559 (“The idea of
immediacy lies at the heart of the exception.”).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to admit
evidence as a present sense impression in the absence of evidence showing that the
declaration was made immediately after the event occurred).
147. See United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2009) (admitting 911
call made “within thirty seconds to a minute after seeing Defendant”); United States
v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (admitting phone call made “only one or
two minutes” after event); United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.
2005) (allowing statement made less than sixty seconds after witnessing event);
United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 1991) (statements made after
walking approximately “100 feet” qualified as present sense impressions); United
States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 802, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (notes made within five to ten
minutes of conversation qualified as present sense impression); see also DAVID F.
BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 8.3, at 257 (4th ed. 2011) (noting Colorado and
Kansas rules requiring precise contemporaneity for admission of present sense
impressions).
148. See United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting
statement made by confidential informant more than fifty minutes after drug
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Further, in cases where the timing between the observation and
speech has been extremely close, many courts have rejected
application of the present sense impression where there appeared to
be adequate time for the declarant to deliberate and make a
conscious statement rather than a purely reflexive statement
describing the event.149
Although
e-present
sense
impressions
reflect
human
communication in a modern format, we can expect trial and
appellate courts to monitor their timing with the same care. Courts
are certain to reject any tweet, text, or status update ostensibly
describing past events.150 Indeed, much of the information that is
posted on a Facebook wall or included in a text message may relate to
the declarant’s past activities, rather than current observations and
activities. These will clearly fail to survive judicial scrutiny of the allimportant timing requirement.
To the extent that e-hearsay
statements, like tweets, do purport to describe ongoing events, courts
can be expected to apply the same rigorous analysis that they have
historically used in this context. Indeed, the electronic format of
these hearsay statements that records the time of their transmission
may assist judicial analysis of timing.151 Once a trial judge finds
information to locate the underlying event in time, the court will be
able to measure the nexus between that event and the transmission of

transaction under present sense impression exception because “courts consistently
require substantial contemporaneity”); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840
(8th Cir. 2004) (finding that a statement made after “an intervening walk or drive”
inadmissible); United States v. Cruz, 765 F.2d 1020, 1024 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
statements of undercover agent several days after the event took place as
insufficiently contemporaneous); United States v. Hamilton, 948 F. Supp. 635, 639
(W.D. Ky. 1996) (rejecting photographic identification hearsay that came
immediately after observation because photographic identification involves more
than a present sense); Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 253 (Del. 2001) (per curiam)
(finding that statements made in 911 call about confrontation one hour earlier were
too far removed from event to qualify as present sense impressions); State v. Moore,
921 P.2d 122, 138 (Haw. 1996) (rejecting application of present sense impression
exception to statements made some time after shooting when declarant flagged
down police).
149. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 336 (describing jurisdictions that allow a
time lapse “so long as it is short enough to exclude, negate, or negative the
likelihood that the statement is the result of deliberation and reflection”).
150. See Thayer, supra note 30, at 72 (requiring that a statement, to be
distinguished from hearsay, must be “concomitant with the principle act” and so
connected “as to be regarded as the mere result and consequence of the coexisting
motives” (citation omitted)).
151. Although it is not impossible for a declarant to game the timing system with
e-hearsay, metadata should be available to help determine the actual timing of any
assertion in the event of a dispute about timing. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co.,
241 F.R.D. 534, 548 (D. Md. 2007) (noting that metadata is a “useful tool for
authenticating electronic records by use of distinctive characteristics”).
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Finally, courts that have rejected nearthe e-hearsay.152
contemporaneous present sense impressions that appear conscious
and deliberate, as opposed to reflexive and spontaneous, may view
any e-hearsay with suspicion.153 Although the social media generation
is admittedly quick on the draw when it comes to texting or tweeting,
courts might find the act of composing a written message to an
audience too deliberate to come within the spirit of the present sense
impression exception.154 Indeed, one noted evidence scholar has
suggested that trial judges should perform a “thought experiment”
in considering present sense impression evidence and exclude
statements “when the declarant would have had to deliberately
process the information before uttering the proffered statement.” 155
The speed at which many can pull the trigger on a text
notwithstanding, the process of composing a message suggests a
degree of deliberation likely to fail such a thought experiment.
Although not dictated by the requirements of Rule 803(1), some
courts have rejected use of the present sense impression exception in
cases where there is an indication that the declarant had some
potential motive to shade or misrepresent the events at issue.156
Courts engaging in this motivational analysis will likely continue in
the context of e-hearsay.157 In cases involving a typical text message
originating with one declarant and sent to a single recipient, courts
are likely to analyze the motivational component with traditional
concerns in mind.158 Courts can be expected to evaluate the

152. State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that text
message was sent three minutes before defendant claimed he fled victim’s house
after argument).
153. See Hallums v. United States, 841 A.2d 1270, 1277 (D.C. 2004) (stating that
the present sense impression exception should not be used to admit statements that
were not truly spontaneous and that involve conscious reflection or recall from
memory).
154. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 345 (“When the thought process is
complex, involving an intermediate step between the receipt of the present sense
impression and the utterance, the utterance falls outside the ambit of Rule
803(1).”). But see Damper, 225 P.3d at 1152 n.3 (taking judicial notice of the speed
with which a text message can be composed).
155. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 346.
156. See id. at 338–39 (describing federal and state applications of the present
sense impression exception requiring “reliability” and rejecting present sense
impressions otherwise consistent with the exception where declarant had a motive to
falsify).
157. See Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1035–36 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(noting that “[m]otive or incentive to lie is an indicium of reliability,” and finding
that “contemplation of litigation” and “anger” constituted motives to lie weighing
against a finding of reliability); Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 385 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008) (excluding a statement based on declarant’s motive to falsify).
158. See Boyd, 458 F. Supp. at 1036 (refusing to admit evidence of a conversation
between two people due to the declarant’s motives to falsify).

RICHTER.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

DON’T JUST DO SOMETHING!

8/27/2012 12:18 PM

1689

relationship between the declarant and the recipient and the purpose
of the message.159 Motivational issues in the case of e-present sense
impressions to a mass audience may be more problematic. In
keeping with concerns about the deliberate nature of posting a tweet
or a status update, courts may be skeptical of the motivations of a
declarant who is communicating with a large audience electronically.
Such motivational concerns, although not prescribed by Rule 803(1),
may continue to limit admissibility of e-hearsay through the present
sense impression in these jurisdictions.
Courts historically have been extremely skeptical of “anonymous”
present sense impressions.160 In attempting to establish the hearsay
declarant’s personal knowledge, as required by Rule 803(1), courts
necessarily inquire into the identity and location of the declarant at
the time of the assertion.161 When hearsay statements are made by
unidentified or anonymous bystanders, assessing personal knowledge
and timing becomes more difficult and courts have been reluctant to
allow such anonymous assertions under the present sense impression
exception.162 With the use of Twitter handles or Facebook identities
unrelated to the real names of electronic declarants, courts are likely
to reject assertions by unknown declarants for failure of the personal
knowledge requirement. To the extent that a declarant can be
identified through his Twitter handle, however, the problem of
personal knowledge could be made easier through use of geolocation

159. See Fischer, 252 S.W.3d at 385 (rejecting trooper’s recorded present sense
impression about a suspect’s performance on field sobriety tests due to officer’s
motive to falsify the test results to advance the competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime).
160. See United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 461 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that
declarant seeking to admit a statement by an unidentified declarant carries a
“heavier burden”); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1) and (2) advisory committee’s note
(stating that courts are generally hesitant to admit statements by anonymous or
unknown declarants).
161. See Brown v. Keane, 355 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The present sense
impression exception applies only to reports of what the declarant has actually
observed through the senses, not to what the declarant merely conjectures.”); see also
5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
803.03[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (“The proponent of evidence
under Rule 803(1) must show that the declarant personally perceived the event or
condition about which the statement was made.”).
162. See United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 1998) (detailing how
an anonymous note failed to satisfy personal knowledge requirement); Miller v.
Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding inadequate evidence of
declarant’s personal knowledge). But see Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.
Supp. 703, 706 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
unidentified caller observed the accident based upon corroborating circumstances);
People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 374 (N.Y. 1993) (allowing present sense impression
by 911 caller “Henry” where officer found circumstances at the scene that matched
his description).
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technology that locates a Twitter user at the time of a tweet.163
Accordingly, under existing judicial interpretation of Rule 803(1),
anonymous or unidentified e-hearsay is unlikely to flow freely into
our trial process.
Still other courts already add an extrinsic corroboration
requirement to the existing requirements of Rule 803(1), demanding
verification of the content of a present sense impression before
admitting it into evidence.164
Some courts simply require
“independent” evidence apart from the hearsay statement to support
the content of the present sense impression, while others demand a
specific type of corroboration by another percipient witness to the
events.165 Jurisdictions taking such a strict view of traditional present
sense impressions under existing Rule 803(1) are unlikely to accept
uncorroborated e-hearsay into evidence without requiring some
additional support. A text message or tweet providing the only
evidence of a disputed event without any independent showing of
declarant’s personal knowledge and contemporaneous assertion will
certainly be rejected by trial and appellate judges that read an
independent corroboration requirement into the Rule.
In sum, unreliable e-hearsay is unlikely to take over the trial
process. In light of the courts’ historical ability to adapt hearsay rules
to constantly evolving human communication platforms, we may have
confidence that judges will respond with appropriate care to the next
generation of present sense impression evidence online. As outlined
above, existing protections in the Federal Rules framework will guard
against indiscriminate admission of e-present sense impressions.
Further, the historic judicial resistance to the present sense
impression portends little judicial tolerance for uncorroborated and
unreliable e-present sense impressions. Thus, there is no urgent
need to amend Rule 803(1) to close the door on casual social media
163. See About the Tweet Location Feature, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/
groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/111-features/articles/78525aboutthetweetlocationfeature (last visited June 14, 2012) (describing “[t]weeting
with . . . location,” which allows Twitter users to add location information to their
tweets).
164. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 303 (3d Cir.
1983) (noting that the exception is generally understood to require some
corroborating testimony), rev’d sub. nom. on other grounds by Matsushita Elect. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328,
1334 (N.Y. 1996) (requiring “some independent verification of the declarant’s
descriptions of the unfolding events”); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 351–54
(noting judicial additions of independent corroboration and equally percipient
witness requirements to present sense impression).
165. Compare People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 909–10 (Mich. 1998)
(requiring extrinsic corroboration of the present sense impression), with State v.
Case, 676 P.2d 241, 245 (N.M. 1984) (requiring an equally percipient witness).
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chatter.
II. THE CRAWFORD REVOLUTION AND THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION
Professor Bellin also posits that the recent revolution in
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence creates an urgent need for
amendment of the present sense impression exception.166 In 2004,
the Supreme Court turned Sixth Amendment analysis of hearsay
upside down with its decision in Crawford v. Washington.167 In
Crawford, the Court discarded the long-standing “adequate indicia of
reliability” test for admitting hearsay against a criminal defendant,
outlined 24 years earlier in Ohio v. Roberts.168 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia announced a new paradigm for Confrontation Clause
analysis of hearsay statements.169 Under Crawford, Confrontation
Clause protections apply only to “testimonial” hearsay statements.170
Although the Court continues to struggle with the contours of the
“testimonial” category, Crawford described “testimonial” statements
as those hearsay “statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 171 Statements
made to assist law enforcement agents in the investigation of a past
crime are within the core of the testimonial category, although the
Court has held that statements made to assist law enforcement
officers responding to an “ongoing emergency” are not
testimonial.172
In support of the new standard, Justice Scalia explained that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees one procedure to test the accuracy of
testimonial statements offered against an accused. According to
Crawford, the Confrontation Clause promises a defendant the
166. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 357–61 (noting the “vanishing” constitutional
limits on admission of the present sense impression).
167. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
168. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69, abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
169. See id. (“[T]he Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).
170. See id. (articulating Sixth Amendment demands for “testimonial” evidence);
see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 810, 824 (2006) (holding that Sixth
Amendment protections extend only to “testimonial” hearsay statements).
171. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (citation omitted). The Court acknowledged
concerns regarding its failure to “articulate a comprehensive definition” of the
testimonial category, but stated that the term covers preliminary hearing testimony,
grand jury testimony, trial testimony, and police interrogations, at a minimum. Id. at
68 & n.10.
172. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828–29 (holding that statements made to meet “an
ongoing emergency” are not testimonial but that statements in response to
“structured police questioning” are testimonial (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53
n.4)).
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opportunity to cross-examine those who give testimony against him
and no substitute for that process of cross-examination is
constitutionally acceptable.173 Crawford, therefore, articulates the
ultimate preference for live testimony, allowing “testimonial” hearsay
to be admitted against a criminal defendant only if the declarant is
“unavailable” for trial and the defendant had a previous opportunity
to cross-examine.174 If the declarant is available and testifies at trial
and is subject to cross-examination, his “testimonial” hearsay
statements are also constitutionally permissible.175 The insistence
upon cross-examination of all “testimonial” hearsay under Crawford
has had the effect of excluding un-cross-examined hearsay statements
by absent declarants in criminal cases that were previously admissible
under the Supreme Court’s Ohio v. Roberts Confrontation Clause
analysis.176
In developing the contours of the Sixth Amendment mandate
following Crawford, the Supreme Court has made clear that there is
no constitutional barrier to the admission of hearsay statements that
are “nontestimonial” in nature.177
Employing an originalist
interpretation, Justice Scalia found that the framers of the
Constitution designed the Confrontation Clause with an eye toward
preventing admission of out-of-court witness statements and
testimony as a substitute for live, confronted trial testimony.178
Hearsay statements outside this “testimonial” category, therefore,
were not the aim of the clause and are free from its control.179 In the
wake of the Crawford reformation, the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide the only safeguard against admission of “nontestimonial”
hearsay statements against a criminal defendant in the federal
system.180
173. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”).
174. Id. at 68.
175. Id. at 59 n.9.
176. See id. at 64–65 (identifying a series of federal cases in which the courts relied
on Roberts to admit testimonial statements that had not been subject to crossexamination).
177. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 (explaining that statements not clearly involving
testimony are not controlled by the Confrontation Clause).
178. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 (arguing that the only exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause that should be considered are the exceptions that were
“established at the time of the founding”).
179. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 (noting that statements not considered
“testimonial” fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause); Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 51 (indicating that nontestimonial statements do not require the protection that
the Confrontation Clause offers).
180. Davis, 547 U.S. at 824. Following Davis’s express removal of Sixth
Amendment protection from nontestimonial hearsay, some state courts have
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Within the Crawford framework, Professor Bellin suggests that most,
if not all present sense impressions will, by definition, fall into the
nontestimonial category because they describe ongoing events and
cannot relate past occurrences in the way a witness giving testimony
does.181 For nontestimonial present sense impressions, evidentiary
rules now offer the only protection against admissibility.182 Professor
Bellin argues that the Federal Rules of Evidence must respond by
adding more stringent protections to prevent admission of
nontestimonial present sense impressions against criminal
defendants.183 For several reasons, Rule 803(1) need not be
amended to close constitutional gaps in protection. Further, adding
a percipient witness requirement to the present sense impression
would eliminate one of the few remaining sources of admissible
hearsay in the domestic violence prosecutions that have already
suffered significantly in Crawford’s wake.
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment Part Ways
To suggest that the Federal Rules of Evidence need to make up for
perceived inadequacies in constitutional protection in the wake of
Crawford is directly at odds with one of the principal policies
underlying the Crawford Confrontation Clause revolution. Under the
long-standing Roberts test for admission of hearsay against a criminal
defendant, the Federal Rules of Evidence played a prominent role.184
Under Roberts, the Sixth Amendment was interpreted to permit
hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant when that hearsay
demonstrated adequate “indicia of reliability.” 185 The Court held
that such constitutionally mandated reliability could be “inferred
without more” in a case where the hearsay evidence fell within “a
firmly rooted hearsay exception.” 186 Over time, the Court designated
continued to apply the protection of the Roberts doctrine to nontestimonial
statements pursuant to confrontation protections embodied in state constitutions.
See, e.g., State v. Camacho, 924 A.2d 99, 116 (Conn. 2007) (applying Roberts to
nontestimonial declaration against interest); State v. Kaufman, 711 S.E.2d 607, 621
(W. Va. 2011) (“[N]ontestimonial statements may be admissible in a criminal trial if
it is shown that the witness was unavailable for trial, and that the witness’s statement
bore adequate indicia of reliability.”).
181. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 358 (“[P]resent sense impressions will likely never
be testimonial.”).
182. Davis, 547 U.S. at 824.
183. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 358 (arguing that Crawford “actually makes present
sense impressions easier for prosecutors to admit”).
184. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (permitting inference of reliability
where “evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception”).
185. Id.
186. Id. The Court also held that the Confrontation Clause normally requires a
showing of unavailability, id., but suggested in a footnote that unavailability is not
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many hearsay exceptions as “firmly rooted” for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment analysis.187 Even hearsay not admissible through firmly
rooted exceptions could be admitted against a criminal defendant if
it demonstrated “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 188 In
examining particularized guarantees of trustworthiness for purposes
of the Sixth Amendment analysis, courts often drew upon
requirements for admission of hearsay under evidentiary rules.189 In
the era in which Roberts reigned, therefore, the rules of evidence had
the power to drive the constitutional analysis.190 Under Roberts,
therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence bore a significant
responsibility to protect constitutional safeguards, as well as other
adversarial tenets.
Following Crawford, the Sixth Amendment analysis has been
severed from any analysis of evidentiary rules. Indeed, Justice Scalia
expressly rejected any connection between the Confrontation Clause
and rules of evidence, giving the Sixth Amendment power and
significance independent of trial rules.191
Under this new
confrontation paradigm, therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence
must serve concerns of a fair and rational trial process, but need not
erect constitutionally important barriers to admissibility in criminal
cases.192 While the hearsay rules should not admit evidence the
Constitution prohibits, they need not exclude evidence the
Constitution permits, absent some compelling justification. Where
Crawford has eliminated Sixth Amendment protection for
nontestimonial statements, there is no constitutional need to create
always required, id. at 65 n.7.
187. See id. at 66 n.8 (approving hearsay admitted through former testimony
exception, dying declarations exception and public and business records
exceptions); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992) (noting wide
acceptance and historical roots of excited utterances and hearsay statements made
for purposes of medical treatment); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183
(1987) (noting that the co-conspirator exception is firmly rooted).
188. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
189. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (holding that in evaluating
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, courts must consider “circumstances
that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief”).
190. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (“[C]ertain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the
‘substance of the constitutional protection.’”).
191. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“Where testimonial
statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . . . .”).
192. Indeed, this state of affairs appears consistent with the original intentions of
the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 803
advisory committee’s note (explaining that “a hearsay rule can function usefully as
an adjunct to the confrontation right in constitutional areas and independently in
non-constitutional areas”).
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more stringent requirements.193 In fact, the stand-alone Crawford
approach to hearsay to some extent may relieve the rule-making
process from constitutional concerns because the Federal Rules of
Evidence no longer serve as the constitutional watchdog for hearsay
statements offered against criminal defendants.194 Because Crawford
eliminates any connection between the rules and the Constitution,
the Crawford revolution may make stringent requirements in
evidentiary rules for the protection of Sixth Amendment concerns less
necessary than they were in the Roberts era, rather than more so.
Furthermore, it appears that Crawford’s non-protection of
nontestimonial hearsay will result in little real change in the
procedure for admitting present sense impressions against criminal
defendants. During the Roberts era, the Supreme Court never
decided whether the present sense impression exception to the
hearsay rule was “firmly rooted” for purposes of Sixth Amendment
analysis.195 The majority of lower courts that addressed the issue,
however, found the present sense impression “firmly rooted” as a
result of its historic connection to the excited utterance and the res
gestae category of hearsay exceptions.196 Thus, in these jurisdictions,
hearsay could automatically be offered against an accused if it fell
within the present sense impression exception under the rules of
evidence and no further constitutional inquiry was required.197
Under Crawford, testimonial present sense impressions will be

193. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006) (noting that testimonial
hearsay marks out not only the “core” of constitutional concerns, but its “perimeter”
as well).
194. The hearsay rules were drafted to avoid tension with the mandate of the
Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66 (2d Cir. 1977)
(recognizing the Advisory Committee’s awareness that the Confrontation Clause and
the Federal Rules of Evidence function separately). Erecting higher barriers to
admission than are required by the constitution is unnecessary to this purpose.
195. See Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 302–03 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004)
(recognizing that the question of whether a present sense impression is firmly rooted
“remains open”).
196. See United States v. Walton, 323 F. App’x 837, 842 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (finding present sense impression firmly-rooted because “res gestae is a
historic concept that embodies declarations of present sense impressions”); United
States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Jones,
299 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Vega, 883 F.2d 1025 (9th
Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349–50 (5th Cir. 1981)
(same), vacated in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam);
Welch v. Sirmons, No. 00-CV-0105-CVE-PJC, 2007 WL 927950, at *10 (N.D. Okla.
2007) (same); Wooten v. Cluff, 69 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (West) 863, 866 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(same); Reedus v. Stegall, 197 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (same); People
v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Mich. 1998) (same).
197. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 121, § 252, at 161 (“[U]nder
Roberts, hearsay falling within a traditional or ‘firmly rooted’ exception that does not
require unavailability was automatically admitted under the Confrontation Clause.”).
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excluded absent an opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the
declarant, regardless of the applicability of the evidentiary rule.198
Thus, Crawford increased protection of criminal defendants in the
testimonial context. In the context of nontestimonial hearsay only,
courts will be permitted to admit present sense impressions that
satisfy evidentiary rules, just as they did under Roberts by classifying
the present sense impression as “firmly rooted.” 199 In the majority of
jurisdictions, therefore, the automatic admission of nontestimonial
present sense impressions against an accused under Crawford
represents no change in the level of protection afforded in the Roberts
era.
Not all courts classified the present sense impression exception as
“firmly rooted” under Roberts, however. Because of the common law
rejection of the present sense impression, at least the Ninth Circuit
declined to classify it as “firmly rooted” for purposes of Ohio v.
Roberts.200
Therefore, prior to Crawford, a trial judge in this
jurisdiction would have conducted two distinct inquiries before
admitting a present sense impression into evidence against an
accused. First, the judge would determine that the hearsay statement
met the requirements for admission under the evidentiary rules.
Even if the statement qualified for admission under the rules, the
judge would then have to determine that the statement in question
displayed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness before allowing
it into evidence.201 With a nontestimonial present sense impression
after Crawford, the hearsay statement may be allowed with no further
inquiry if Rule 803(1) permits admission. To the extent that they

198. Some present sense impressions may fit into the testimonial category and will
have to satisfy the Crawford cross-examination requirement prior to admission. See
United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (admitting, as a present sense
impression, statements made over a walkie-talkie by testifying police officer to
another officer); United States v. Campbell, 782 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(finding that a police officer’s recorded statements to dispatcher during pursuit were
present sense impressions). Even in the context of nontestimonial statements, courts
have carefully reviewed trial courts’ admission of hearsay evidence against criminal
defendants. See, e.g., State v. Kaufman, 711 S.E.2d 607, 624 (W. Va. 2011) (reversing
defendant’s conviction due to admission of victim’s diary, notwithstanding its
nontestimonial character).
199. Reedus, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
200. See United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness requirement in light of absence of caselaw classifying the present sense impression as firmly rooted); Guam v. Ignacio, 10
F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether the present sense
impression is firmly rooted and applying particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
test); Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(suggesting that present sense impressions are not firmly rooted).
201. See, e.g., Boyd, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (requiring particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness).
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have lost the benefit of a separate analysis of trustworthiness, criminal
defendants, in theory, enjoy less protection against admission of
nontestimonial present sense impressions than they had prior to
Crawford, at least in the Ninth Circuit.202
To argue that criminal defendants are entitled to greater
protection against the admission of nontestimonial statements,
however,
is
simply
to
chafe
against
Crawford’s
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction and the lack of constitutional
protection extended to nontestimonial hearsay in Crawford’s brave
new world of confrontation. To be sure, there is a raging debate
about the merits of Crawford, the validity and viability of the
testimonial category, as well as the non-protection for statements
outside that category.203
Any concerns regarding criminal
defendants’ legitimate need for greater protection than that afforded
by the prevailing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment ought to be
addressed within the context of that larger debate.204
In the meantime, Rule 803(1) should not be amended to create
obstacles to the admission of present sense impressions against
criminal defendants unless it is shown that the existing requirements
are inadequate to ensure a fair and rational trial process. To suggest
that Crawford has made the present sense impression inadequately
protective of criminal defendants is to suggest that the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence sanctioned an unreliable hearsay
exception, counting on the Sixth Amendment to intervene to achieve
a fair result in criminal cases. Such a suggestion is at odds with the
design and operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.205 As detailed
above, the current rule allows only a narrow category of hearsay
statements made by a declarant while observing an event or condition

202. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (noting absence of any
meaningful protection for defendants under Roberts).
203. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure:
Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require that Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 693
(2007) (explaining that Crawford’s procedural requirements are overly strict);
Orenstein, supra note 16, at 162 (arguing that Crawford’s focus on testimonial
statements only left defendants vulnerable to several other kinds of hearsay). But see
Ariana J. Torchin, Note, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of Testimonial
Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581, 584–85 (2006) (arguing that
Crawford helped to clarify the inconsistencies created by the reliability test in Roberts).
204. Many courts continue to apply Roberts analysis to nontestimonial hearsay
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
no such analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“Where a hearsay statement is found to be nontestimonial, we continue to evaluate
the declaration under Ohio v. Roberts.”).
205. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing the well-recognized
distinction between the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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or immediately thereafter, describing the event or condition.206 Trial
and appellate courts carefully police these requirements and admit
present sense impressions somewhat sparingly.207 Accordingly, the
protections the current requirements afford against indiscriminate
admission of present sense impressions are significant.208 Although
Crawford creates its own constitutional testifying witness requirement
for previously uncross-examined testimonial hearsay, it demands no
such protection in the context of a nontestimonial present sense
impression.209 The Federal Rules of Evidence need not alter a now
time-honored exception to the hearsay rule to impose requirements
beyond those constitutionally mandated.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
remains in flux. The Court’s most recent confrontation installments
in Michigan v. Bryant,210 and Williams v. Illinois,211 have revealed
significant discord on the Court regarding the future interpretation
of Crawford and the contours of the Confrontation Clause in the
context of hearsay.212 As discussed further in Part III, the Federal
Rules of Evidence should not be amended in the wake of every shift
in constitutional analysis from the high Court. Before adapting
evidentiary rules to complement the Supreme Court’s Confrontation
Clause analysis, rule-makers would benefit from further clarification
from the Court.
B. Domestic Violence and Present Sense Impressions
Amending the present sense impression exception to require a
testifying percipient witness in the wake of Crawford is not simply
without justification. Rather, such an amendment would have
collateral consequences that will harm the adversarial process as it
exists post-Crawford. Adding a percipient witness requirement to Rule
206. See supra Part I.A (describing the basic requirements for qualification as a
present sense impression).
207. See supra Part I.D.1 (considering reasons why trial and appellate courts will
regulate admission of e-hearsay under the existing requirements of the present sense
impression exception).
208. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (highlighting the safeguards
inherent in the rule).
209. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 689 (2004) (allowing states to use their
discretion when developing hearsay laws relating to nontestimonial statements).
210. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
211. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality opinion).
212. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (explaining that “five
justices specifically reject every aspect of [the plurality opinion’s] reasoning and
every paragraph of its explication.”); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(stating that the majority opinion “distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
and leaves it in a shambles,” and that “[i]nstead of clarifying the law, the Court
makes itself the obfuscator of last resort”).
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803(1) would close one of the last remaining constitutionally
appropriate avenues for admitting victim hearsay in domestic
violence prosecutions.
As many scholars have noted, the Crawford shift in Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence has had a significant impact on domestic
violence prosecutions.213 In that class of cases, victims often fail to
appear at trial to testify live against their abusers subject to crossexamination.214 Under the Roberts regime, the hearsay statements of
absent domestic violence victims were admitted through firmly
rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule or when the statements
displayed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.215 Under
Crawford, however, the same testimonial hearsay statements to law
enforcement personnel reporting violence must be excluded from
trial in the absence of some opportunity for cross-examination of a
truly unavailable victim before trial.216 For the same reasons that it is
challenging to obtain trial testimony from victims of domestic
violence, it is likewise difficult to ensure adequate cross-examination
prior to trial.
Although the Supreme Court suggested that the doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing would pave the way for admission of hearsay
statements by intimidated domestic violence victims, the Court
subsequently interpreted the forfeiture doctrine narrowly to apply
only in cases where a defendant “intentionally” engages in
wrongdoing for the “purpose” of preventing the victim’s trial
testimony.217 While domestic violence victims may be reluctant to
213. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 810, 832 (2006) (“Respondents in both
cases, joined by a number of their amici, contend that the nature of the offenses
charged in these two cases —domestic violence—requires greater flexibility in the
use of testimonial evidence.”); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91
VA. L. REV. 747, 768 (2005) (explaining that Crawford has had an especially large
impact on domestic violence cases due to accusers’ frequent refusal to cooperate
with the prosecution during trial).
214. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 405 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that domestic violence “is difficult to prove in court because the victim is
generally reluctant or unable to testify”).
215. See Lininger, supra note 213, at 756 (recounting the requirements for
admitting hearsay statements under Roberts); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and
the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 320 (2005) (“Roberts provides a cost-free pro forma stamp of
approval for all firmly rooted hearsay of unavailable declarants.”).
216. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 377 (reversing the admission of testimonial victim
hearsay through California hearsay exception absent a finding of the defendant’s
intent to prevent victim’s trial testimony as a necessary condition for forfeiture of
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation); Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (excluding
“testimonial” victim statement admitted as excited utterance absent finding of
forfeiture).
217. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 406 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that “the Court
breaks the promise implicit” in Davis concerning application of forfeiture doctrine
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testify against their attackers for a variety of reasons, it is often
difficult for a prosecutor to prove intentional intimidation for the
purposes of preventing testimony.218 Because of the nature of
domestic violence, there is often inadequate evidence without the
victim’s reports to prove the crime.219 Therefore, the Crawford regime
has made it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute
domestic offenders in a large class of cases.220
In the wake of Crawford, courts have found present sense
impressions and excited utterances reporting ongoing domestic
attacks to 911 operators, other rescue personnel, and friends and
neighbors to be nontestimonial under the Supreme Court’s
“ongoing emergency” doctrine outlined in Davis v. Washington.221
Thus, these present sense impressions have been admitted in
domestic violence prosecutions consistent with the demands of the
Sixth Amendment articulated by Crawford and have allowed some
level of continued enforcement in this important area.222 Amending
in domestic violence prosecutions); Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (noting that domestic
violence victims are “notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion” and that
the “Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce” when defendants
intimidate victims).
218. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing “serious practical
evidentiary problems” in applying purposeful intimidation standard of forfeiture and
posing query: “Who knows precisely what passed through H’s mind at the critical
moment?”). But see State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010) (admitting
victim’s testimonial statements to police after finding that defendant forfeited his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by calling the victim from jail, coercing her
to drop charges, and threatening her if she did not do so).
219. See supra note 213.
220. See Orenstein, supra note 16 (declaring that Crawford “has profoundly
affected domestic violence cases, making it much harder to prosecute them
successfully”).
221. Indeed, Justice Scalia noted in Giles that nontestimonial victim statements
would remain an important source of evidence in the domestic violence context after
Crawford. Giles, 554 U.S. at 376; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 332–33
(noting that present sense impressions “often take the form of 911 calls in domestic
violence cases” and that admissibility of 911 calls as present sense impressions can be
determinative “[g]iven the tendency of domestic violence victims to recant”).
222. See, e.g., Davis, 547 U.S. at 821, 834 (affirming the admission of
nontestimonial excited utterance in domestic violence trial); United States v. Davis,
577 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2009) (allowing 911 caller’s statements admitted as
present sense impression and finding no Crawford violation); United States v. Arnold,
486 F.3d 177, 189 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding 911 call to be nontestimonial under
Crawford, using excited utterance exception); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838,
844 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding 911 call fit present sense impression and was
nontestimonial); United States v. Kuo, No. 10-CR-671 (S-1) (KAM), 2011 WL 145471,
at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2011) (finding 911 present sense impressions nontestimonial
in context of non-domestic assault); Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876, 886 (Colo.
2005) (finding excited utterances nontestimonial and admissible in domestic
violence prosecution); see also United States v. Price, 58 F. App’x 105, 106 (6th Cir.
2003) (finding, pre-Crawford, that a child’s 911 call reporting that “[m]y dad has a
gun and is trying to shoot my mom” as a present sense impression); United States v.
Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 618 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding, pre-Crawford, that a mother’s
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the hearsay exception for the present sense impression to make its
requirements more stringent —and specifically amending it to
require a testifying percipient witness in all cases—promises to
eliminate the utility of one of the last remaining sources of
constitutionally competent evidence in domestic violence cases.
Assuming that a victim makes a hearsay report to an absent 911
operator during or immediately following an attack where only the
victim and the abuser are present, there will be no percipient witness
to corroborate the victim’s hearsay report as a condition of
admissibility. Even if the 911 operator receiving the call could
perceive the noise of a domestic disturbance during the call, that
operator would be unable to confirm the identity of the attacker or
the sequence of events from personal knowledge. Of course, the
issues of identity and sequence of events would be the most salient in
a domestic violence prosecution. With an added percipient witness
requirement, therefore, the victim’s statements to the absent 911
operator during this emergency call would be inadmissible under the
present sense impression exception and unavailable in the
prosecution of the alleged offender.
Further, the e-hearsay that is the purported catalyst for a percipient
witness amendment may be a crucial source of constitutionally
competent evidence in domestic violence cases. The culture of
instant communication with hand-held devices allows otherwise
isolated victims to reach out to remote friends and neighbors during
an attack quickly and easily with an e-mail, phone call, or text
message. When a victim is dead or otherwise unavailable at a trial
arising out of the encounter, this contemporaneous window into the
events as they unfolded may provide powerful evidence that the
victim cannot. Requiring a percipient witness within Rule 803(1) will
close the door on this valuable evidence.
The Arizona case of State v. Damper223 illustrates the potential
importance of e-present sense impressions in the domestic violence
context.224 In that case, Marcus Damper was convicted of the seconddegree murder of his girlfriend.225 Although the defendant admitted
shooting the victim in her bed during a disagreement, he claimed
that the shooting was accidental. Moments before the fatal shooting,
however, a text message was sent from the victim’s phone to her

statements to responders were present sense impressions).
223. 225 P.3d 1148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
224. See id. at 1150 (admitting into evidence a text message sent by the victim
under the present sense impression rule).
225. Id.
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friend stating, in essence, “Can you come over? Me and Marcus are
fighting and I have no gas.” 226
The defendant objected to the admission of this text message at
trial as a present sense impression.227 Damper argued that the text
violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, was inadmissible
hearsay, and was inadequately authenticated prior to its admission.228
The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s arguments
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, finding that, whether the text was
an “urgent cry for help” or a “casual request to a friend,” it was
nontestimonial within the Crawford framework.229 Further, the court
held that the text was properly admitted as a present sense
impression because it related an event of which the victim had
personal knowledge —her argument with the defendant.230 The
court also looked to the timing of the text, as well as the victim’s use
of the present tense in the text to decide that the text was created
and sent during the argument or shortly thereafter.231 Finally, the
court found adequate evidence to authenticate the text as having
come from the victim to justify its admission.232 Thus, the admission
of the text message was affirmed and Damper’s conviction upheld.233
The text message in Damper presents a classic example of the type
of e-hearsay that may aid in the prosecution of domestic abuse
consistent with the mandate of Crawford, that would be foreclosed by
a percipient witness requirement. With an isolated victim like the
deceased girlfriend in Damper, there will be no trial witness capable of
corroborating the unavailable victim’s version of events. Although
Professor Bellin suggests that remote declarants like the victim in
Damper can “video chat” to allow contemporaneous perception by
another witness, this remedy is plainly unrealistic in this context.234
Further, the victim’s text message was within the core of the reliability
justification for present sense impressions where there was ample
226. Id. The text was written “part in Spanish and text lingo,” but was translated
by the recipient, as well as a police detective. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1150–51.
229. Id. at 1151.
230. Id. at 1152.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1153 (pointing to the fact that the text came from the victim’s
programmed number, the fact that the phone used to send the text was discovered
next to the victim’s body, and finally, that there was no evidence that anyone other
than the victim had access to the phone to send the text).
233. Id.
234. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 371 n.140 (“In a more modern context, this would
permit present sense observations communicated, for example, during a video chat,
where the person who relays the observation to the jury was viewing a similar
(virtual) reality as the declarant at the time of the statement.”).
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evidence to support the requirements of Rule 803(1) apart from the
text message itself. Although Damper characterized his interaction
with the victim more benignly, he conceded that he and the victim
had some discussion or disagreement on the morning of her death
during which he shot her.235 The victim clearly had personal
knowledge of her own discussion with the defendant, demonstrating
the first-hand information necessary to satisfy Rule 803(1). Further,
it was clear that the text was sent contemporaneously with the
argument that the victim was describing due to the timing of the text,
as well as her use of the present tense in the text itself. Finally, the
victim was found dead in her bed with her cell phone at her side.236
Such reliable e-hearsay can offer an invaluable and constitutionally
sound window into domestic attacks that are often perpetrated
without witnesses standing by. Existing requirements of Rule 803(1)
will prevent admission of wholly uncorroborated accusations even
without Sixth Amendment oversight. To amend the Federal Rules of
Evidence to foreclose the use of reliable and constitutionally
permissible evidence of vital importance in the domestic violence
context would close one of the few remaining avenues for allowing
victims’ voices to be heard.
C. Civil Cases
Finally, to the extent that addition of a percipient witness
requirement to Rule 803(1) constitutes a reaction to Crawford, it
represents an overly broad solution. Federal Rule of Evidence 803
defines twenty-three hearsay exceptions available in both criminal
and civil federal proceedings.237 An amendment to Rule 803(1) to
add a percipient witness requirement, therefore, will affect the
admission of present sense impressions in civil cases, as well as against
the accused in criminal prosecutions. Such a broad amendment to a
hearsay exception applicable in both the criminal and civil context
will eliminate valuable evidence offered outside the criminal context.
To the extent that any amendment to Rule 803(1) is justified by
Crawford and its progeny, the amendment should be narrowly tailored
to address this concern.

235. Indeed, the text message did not necessarily accuse defendant of any
wrongdoing. It did not say Marcus is “hitting me” or “threatening me with a gun.”
Rather, it stated that the victim and Marcus were “fighting.” Id. at 1150.
236. Id. at 1153.
237. FED. R. EVID. 803.
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III. THE CASE FOR CAUTION

As outlined in Parts I and II above, there is no urgent need to
amend the present sense impression exception to account for ehearsay. Should rule-makers consider a proposal to amend the
exception, however, such a proposal should be approached with
caution for several reasons. The timing and scope of any e-hearsay
project should be carefully considered. A hasty or piecemeal
modification of a single hearsay exception to account for changing
norms of communication could create more problems than it
resolves. To the extent that amendments to the present sense
impression exception are considered, a percipient witness
requirement should not be adopted. Requiring a percipient witness
would undermine the utility of the exception and is at odds with the
fundamental purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence to achieve
accurate and fair fact-finding.238 Should rule-makers decide to
consider a revision, there are several possible alternatives to a
percipient witness requirement that would better serve the intended
purpose of the present sense impression, while providing a measure
of security against unreliable e-hearsay.
A. Haste Makes Waste
To the extent that rule-makers wish to consider amending the
present sense impression exception, any amendment aimed at ehearsay appears premature at this point in the development of the
social-media revolution.
Courts and litigants have substantial
experience in adapting hearsay rules to constantly evolving methods
of communication.239 Consistent with the strong common law
tradition that serves as the foundation for the Federal Rules of
Evidence, trial and appellate judges should be given the first
opportunity to address e-hearsay problems under existing doctrine.
Indeed, courts are only beginning to issue rulings dealing with
admissibility of text messages and the like.240 There appears to be no
reported case deciding admissibility of a tweet as a present sense
impression.
Rule-makers should allow courts time to develop methodology for

238. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to
administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination.”).
239. See supra Part I (discussing constant evolution of human communication that
must be addressed by hearsay doctrine).
240. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 350 n.73 (collecting cases).
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evaluating e-hearsay under the present sense impression exception
before charging in to correct a potentially non-existent problem. If
judges continue to carefully control admission of present sense
impressions, there will be no need to alter the framework for the
exception. If, however, courts appear unable to filter social-media
and other e-hearsay using existing tools and tweets, texts, and status
updates begin flooding the trial process with little restriction, rulemakers can act to correct the problem. By allowing courts time to
handle e-hearsay in the first instance, drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence may marshal valuable data regarding problem areas to
inform any future amendment.
Rule-makers could examine
inconsistencies and infirmities in judicial opinions allowing e-hearsay
and use perceived patterns to craft an amendment that will directly
resolve genuine problems. Although technological progress moves at
lightning speed, the rule-making process may benefit from a more
measured pace.
Finally, to the extent that rule-makers are concerned that the
social-media revolution could require reconsideration of the present
sense impression, they should allow sufficient time for the electronic
communication revolution to reach a point of relative stability before
re-writing the exception. There can be no doubt that modern
communication capabilities represent a moving target.
New
platforms for electronic communication emerge on an almost daily
basis at this juncture in wireless communication development.241 In
order to craft revisions to the exception that adequately account for
emerging methods of on-line communication, rule-makers should
allow time for further development of technology and electronic
communications to avoid drafting an amendment that is moot or
inadequate before its effective date.242
B. Piecemeal Amendments to Hearsay Exceptions
In considering possible amendments to hearsay rules to account
for evolving electronic modes of communication, rule-makers should
carefully consider the scope and breadth of such an undertaking.
Drafters should be wary of amending a single hearsay exception like
the present sense impression without carefully considering the

241. See, e.g., Hossain, supra note 56 (describing “CrimePush” as new app available
on iTunes to report ongoing crime with the push of a button).
242. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537 (D. Md. 2007) (noting
that e-discovery revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has “only
heightened, not lessened” the discussion of discovery of electronically stored
information).
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ramifications of e-hearsay for the rest of Article Eight. The hearsay
exceptions have a somewhat symbiotic relationship that requires a
holistic assessment of all hearsay exceptions within the Federal Rules
of Evidence before any attempt is made to revise or amend
exceptions to account for the rise of social media. Revising hearsay
exceptions individually to account for broad-reaching developments
like technology and evolving Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
threatens to be inefficient, to create collateral consequences with
respect to unrevised exceptions, and to create ever-expanding
labyrinthine hearsay rules. Hearsay already suffers from the greatest
complexity within the Federal Rules of Evidence and has drawn
constant attacks from scholars, practitioners, judges, and law students
alike.243 Piecemeal amendment promises to exacerbate this problem.
While the culture of social media, with its emphasis on constant
publication of ongoing activities, certainly has special significance for
the present sense impression exception, other hearsay exceptions are
certain to be affected by the rise of e-hearsay.244 Excited utterances
covered by Rule 803(2) raise “bootstrapping” concerns reminiscent
of those involved in interpreting the present sense impression that
could arise in the e-hearsay context. A text or tweet could relate to a
startling event and even describe it to social media followers. A court
could conceivably find that the nature of the event described was
“startling” within the meaning of the excited utterance exception
243. See Ronald J. Allen, Commentary: A Response to Professor Friedman: The Evolution
of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L. REV. 797, 800 (1992) (concluding
that the hearsay rule no longer seriously contributes in any robust way to substantial
justice); Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game Theoretic Analysis of
Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 724 (1992) (arguing that the resolution of a hearsay
dispute is “essentially a matter of deciding who should bear the burden of producing
the declarant, or . . . how the court should allocate the burden”); Christopher B.
Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV.
367, 368 (1992) (acknowledging that “[p]racticing lawyers never tire of talking about
hearsay and commentators in the academy never tire of reforming it”); Roger Park,
A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 54 (1987) (arguing
for a distinction between civil and criminal cases); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing
Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 894 (1992)
(noting that “[t]he degree of consensus among twentieth-century evidence scholars
concerning the intellectual bankruptcy of hearsay doctrine is nothing short of
remarkable.”); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of
Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (observing
that the Rules will redeem an important area of procedure from chaos); Eleanor
Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (1987)
(arguing that the current hearsay rule “merely glosses over [problems for the trier of
fact and for the party opponent] by purporting to sort more reliable hearsay from
less reliable in advance”); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV.
331, 331 (1960) (supporting the Uniform Rules because present evidence rules “fall
short of providing a satisfactory solution to the hearsay problem”).
244. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 374 n.152 (recognizing that “the state of mind
exception may also be in need of updating in light of modern developments.”).
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and that the tone and content of the tweet or text demonstrated that
the declarant remained under the stress of excitement caused by the
event while texting.245 If such e-hearsay were sent to a friend or
posted on Twitter or Facebook, a court could also find them to be
nontestimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Thus,
there is a possibility that uncorroborated social media excited
utterances could be admitted through Rule 803(2).246 Hearsay
statements relating declarant’s existing state of mind, motive, intent,
plan, or emotional, sensory or physical condition covered by Rule
803(3) seem particularly likely to be made on Twitter or Facebook.247
One can certainly envision dying declarations delivered via text
message or tweet.248
Adding a rigid percipient witness requirement to the present sense
impression exception will drive litigants to use similar hearsay
exceptions where the percipient witness requirement cannot be
satisfied. The Damper case illustrates this concern.249 In that case, the
deceased victim’s text, “Can you come over? Me and Marcus are
fighting. I don’t have any gas,” would no longer be an admissible
present sense impression absent a percipient witness able to vouch
for the message.250 The prosecution could simply skip next door to
the excited utterance exception and argue that a “fight” is by
definition a “startling” event and that the declarant’s excitement was
reflected in her cry for help and efforts to flee the scene with the aid
of her friend.251 The prosecution could argue that the use of the
present tense in the text demonstrated that the exciting event was
still ongoing and that declarant’s text was sent under the continuing
stress of the fight. A court could conceivably accept such an
245. See State v. Ford, 778 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Neb. 2010) (rejecting challenge to
admission of text message, “I just got raped . . By Jake . . I don’t know what to do!”
as an excited utterance).
246. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). As discussed with respect to the present sense
impression above, this possibility also appears unlikely in light of existing evidentiary
policies and judicial interpretation of the excited utterance. To the extent that
courts would be inclined to admit present sense impressions wholly without
foundation, however, a similar tendency would appear in the context of the excited
utterance.
247. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
248. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (providing a hearsay exception for statements
made by the declarant about the declarant’s cause of death when the declarant
believes her death is imminent).
249. State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1151–52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding a
text message to be nontestimonial because there was nothing to show that the sender
intended it to be used for later prosecution).
250. Id. at 1150.
251. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (defining an excited utterance as “[a] statement relating
to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement that it caused”).
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argument and allow the excludable present sense impression in
through the excited utterance back door.252 It makes little sense to
single out the present sense impression for rigid controls and leave
the excited utterance untouched, particularly where scholars have
noted the inferior reliability of excited utterances.253
Although there will be a large class of cases in which such an
argument for excitement will be unavailable based upon the
mundane nature of e-hearsay, this continued avenue of admissibility
in some cases undermines the utility of the single exception
amendment at a minimum.254 In addition, it is possible that courts
and litigants could interpret a single exception amendment as a
signal of approval for liberal admission of e-hearsay through other
exceptions. By negative inference, judges could decide that rulemakers harbored particular concerns about the reliability of e-present
sense impressions not raised by e-hearsay offered through other
exceptions. Accordingly, judges could freely admit e-hearsay in other
contexts secure in the understanding that rule-makers had provided
special safeguards against e-hearsay where such protection was
necessary.
To be sure, there are circumstances in which amendment of a
single hearsay exception is appropriate where a particular policy
consideration is unique to that exception.255 When the perceived
need for amendment derives from broad policy concerns that
promise to touch all hearsay doctrine in some manner, however, an
isolated review of any one hearsay exception is particularly
inappropriate. The age of electronic communication and the Sixth
Amendment revolution both represent far-reaching paradigm shifts
that promise to reverberate throughout Article Eight. Any effort to
252. Attempts to utilize other hearsay exceptions to avoid rigid limitations in a
specific exception are common under the Federal Rules. When Congress imposed a
strict prohibition within the public records exception on the admission of matters
observed or factual findings of law enforcement agents, litigants were quick to utilize
its close cousin, the business records exception, in an effort to avoid the prohibition.
See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 71 (2d Cir. 1977). With a strong legislative
history supporting the public records prohibition as absolute and a constitutional
component to the prohibition, courts prevented its circumvention through the
business records exception. Id.
253. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 352 (“If there is no corroboration
requirement for an inferior species of hearsay [excited utterances], it is nonsense to
prescribe such a requirement for a superior type of hearsay evidence.”).
254. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:67, at 567 (“The main utility of
Fed. R. Evid. 803(1) is in cases where the utterance is clearly contemporaneous but
nothing startling happened.”).
255. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (recently amended to make former one-way
corroboration requirement for an inculpatory hearsay statement offered by a
criminal defendant equally applicable to prosecution use of declarations against
interest).
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amend the hearsay rules to account for either of these shifts in the
litigation landscape should involve a comprehensive review of the
entire structure of Article Eight, rather than a targeted amendment
to the hearsay exception for present sense impressions.
C. A “Percipient Witness” Is Not the Answer: Benefits of Electronic Evidence
at Trial
Critics of the present sense impression exception have proposed
various changes to the Federal Rule.256 One oft-proposed revision,
recently advocated by Professor Bellin, would require corroboration
for the present sense impression in the form of a percipient
witness— “someone who was present at the time the statement was
made . . . and who ‘received’ (or made) the statement.” 257 According
to Professor Bellin, this percipient witness should be able to “clarify,
vouch for, and, if necessary, discredit the out-of-court statement.” 258
While such an amendment would certainly eliminate reliability
concerns regarding the hearsay statement, it promises to undermine
the value of the present sense impression in the very cases where it
can be most useful. Fixing Rule 803(1) by adding a percipient
witness requirement will serve its purpose, but it comes at too great a
cost.259
While proponents of the original present sense impression
exception may have expected the presence of a percipient witness in
the typical case, the present sense impression has proved a powerful
tool in disputed cases where the hearsay declarant is alone or without
a witness who is able to perceive the described event and relate it to
the jury at trial. Even where the witness relating the present sense
impression is physically present at the time of declarant’s hearsay
statement, there are circumstances in which that witness is not
capable of perceiving and corroborating the event in question. In
the classic telephone conversation cases, the declarant has a phone
conversation while the trial witness listens only to the declarant’s side

256. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 344–54 (chronicling various “judicial
gloss[es]” added by trial and appellate courts).
257. Bellin, supra note 6, at 370; see also Jon Waltz, The Present Sense Impression
Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 884
(1981) (arguing that legislative history of Rule 803(1) justifies a percipient witness
requirement).
258. Bellin, supra note 6, at 370.
259. See People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373 (N.Y. 1993) (“Insisting that the
declarant’s descriptions of the events must be corroborated in court by a witness who
was present with the declarant and who observed the very same events would deprive
the exception of most, if not all, of its usefulness.”).
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of the conversation.260 Upon hanging up the telephone, the
declarant describes the other side of the conversation to the
witness.261 Finding that the declarant had personal knowledge of the
full conversation and described that event immediately after
perceiving it, courts have allowed the physically present witness to
testify to declarant’s present sense impression regarding the entire
conversation, even though the trial witness cannot corroborate,
clarify or discredit declarant’s description.262 Adding a percipient
witness requirement to Rule 803(1) could exclude statements like
these reported by even physically present witnesses.
In other cases, the present sense impression exception has been
used to admit declarants’ statements to remote or absent witnesses.
Sometimes, these statements are made before the occurrence of any
“startling event,” making the present sense impression the only
available hearsay exception.263 In the classic case, a victim of
subsequent violence relates the presence of the defendant to a
remote witness over the telephone.264 In cases where the witness on
the other end of the line overhears the arrival of someone, the
witness has some ability to perceive the event in question.265 Still, that
witness would not be “equally percipient” and would be unable to
corroborate or disavow the most important point—the identity of the

260. See, e.g., Nuttall v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 551–52 (3d Cir. 1956).
261. See United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 322–23 (4th Cir.
1982) (allowing present sense impression describing telephone conversation);
United States v. Early, 657 F.2d 195, 197–98 (8th Cir. 1981) (admitting evidence of a
self-reported conclusion about the identity of the person on the other end of a
phone conversation); Nuttall, 235 F.2d at 551–52 (admitting husband’s hearsay
characterization of a phone conversation to his wife who only overheard his side of
the conversation); Knudson v. Director, N.D. Dep’t of Trans., 530 N.W.2d 313, 317
(N.D. 1995) (explaining the present sense impression exception).
262. See, e.g., Nuttall, 235 F.2d at 553 (explaining that contemporaneous
characterizations of phone conversations are less likely to involve conscious
misrepresentation).
263. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:67, at 559 (explaining that
present sense impressions may be more reliable than excited utterances simply
because the “speaker is not distracted by the pull of an emotional upheaval”).
264. See, e.g., Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (D.N.J. 1982) (admitting
statement made in the course of a telephone conversation that “the guy is here to fix
the air conditioner”); Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Ky. 2005),
overruled by Padsett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W. 3d 336 (Ky. 2010) (admitting victim’s
telephone statement to sister in murder trial that defendant was “sitting at the
bottom of the hill”); State v. Salgado, 974 P.2d 661, 663 (N.M. 1999) (admitting
murder victim’s greeting, “[h]ey Timo, what’s up,” to visitor shortly before his death
overheard by telephone witness). Present sense impressions to remote witnesses
have been important in other contexts as well. See State v. Wright, 817 A.2d 600, 605
(R.I. 2003) (admitting statement over phone by defendant’s mother describing her
sudden discovery of victim’s purse).
265. See Tard, 552 F. Supp. at 1350–51 (admitting evidence when the witness
overheard the arrival of the air-conditioning repairman over the phone).
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arriving assailant. In other cases, the remote witness will have no way
of perceiving or corroborating the arrival of someone else at all.266
Where the remote witness can verify that the declarant was describing
ongoing events within her personal knowledge at the time — who was
present, near, or arriving—courts have found the present sense
impression applicable.267 When the subsequent murder of the
declarant unequivocally supports declarant’s statement that someone
indeed arrived, these hearsay statements present few reliability
concerns.268
The present sense impression has also been an
important source of evidence in 911 cases, after an emergency or
startling event has arisen.269 In these cases, a remote 911 operator
cannot corroborate the events described by the caller.
It is in these cases, where the declarant is isolated at the time of the
hearsay assertion and dead or otherwise unavailable for trial, that the
exception has its greatest utility to the adversary process. As
described in Part I, the existing framework of the rules guarantees
significant protection against admission of present sense impressions
wholly without foundation, even in this context.270 Adding a
percipient witness requirement to the rule would eliminate the use of
the exception in cases like these where it can add the most. Allowing
the use of a present sense impression only where a percipient witness
is able to confirm the events related by the hearsay statement would
mean present sense impressions would only be admitted when they
were truly superfluous and duplicative of existing live testimony.271
Although present sense impressions that duplicate live testimony
could serve to reinforce or emphasize the testimony, a percipient

266. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 494 A.2d 426, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(victim’s statements to police over phone not within present sense impression where
police could not hear corroborating noise in the background).
267. See Tard, 552 F. Supp. at 1350–51.
268. See Salgado, 974 P.2d at 663 (admitting murder victim’s greeting to visitor,
which was overheard by telephone witness, shortly before his death).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2007) (admitting
911 report that man with tag number 8549VZ had threatened a caller and was
carrying a gun); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006)
(admitting an anonymous caller’s statement to a 911 operator because it was
nontestimonial); see also People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373 (N.Y. 1993) (“If
corroboration by an ‘equally percipient witness’ were required in this case . . . the
911 tape should not have been admitted. The police who testified to the conditions
and events at the scene were not present when the calls were made and could not
have observed the events at the precise moment that they were being described by
the 911 caller.”).
270. See supra Part I.D.2.
271. See Brown, 610 N.E.2d at 373 (“If such an eyewitness is available to testify to
the events, there is certainly no pressing need for the hearsay testimony.”); see also
Bellin, supra note 6, at 350 (noting that a present sense impression related at trial by
a percipient witness “merely supplements a witness’s live testimony”).
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witness requirement will relegate the present sense impression to a
supporting role.
While the recent call to amend Rule 803(1) comes in response to
the rise of social media and other wireless communication
opportunities, it is important to note that the addition of a percipient
witness requirement will alter the application of the exception in
more traditional communication contexts. A percipient witness
requirement, ostensibly designed to address unreliable e-hearsay,
could require the exclusion of present sense impressions even when
communicated orally.
An amendment designed to deal with
concerns over technological advancement and the constant churning
out of tweets, texts and status updates will have an impact on
previously admissible hearsay that is not the product of the social
media revolution at all.
This impact of a percipient witness requirement reveals the
proposal for what it really is—an attempt to revisit the present sense
impression exception altogether. Throughout its history, the present
sense impression has had detractors who would eliminate it as
inadequately reliable.272
The social-media revolution has not
fundamentally altered the operation of the present sense impression
exception.273 It has simply provided a new and vogue opportunity to
launch the same criticisms and arguments against its viability that
have plagued the exception since its recognition.
Finally, a percipient witness requirement would introduce thorny
problems of interpretation that would further diminish the value of
the present sense impression exception. First, courts would be
required to decide what level of “perception” was required. An
amendment that demanded an “equally percipient witness” would
involve courts in determining declarant’s perspective, compared to
that of the percipient witness. Even a physically present witness may
have an inferior vantage point and level of personal knowledge than
the declarant. Questions regarding equality of perception threaten
to introduce inconsistency and unpredictability into the application
of the exception. Although Professor Bellin suggests that requiring
equal percipience is “unwarranted,” 274 judges and litigants are
certain to struggle with identifying the optimal level of percipience
needed to allow the trial witness to vouch for or discredit the present
sense impression. An amendment to the present sense impression
could, as Professor Bellin proposes, endorse trial testimony by a
272. See supra Part I.B.
273. See supra Part I.B.
274. Bellin, supra note 6, at 371.
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“partially percipient witness.” 275 Should drafters of a revision
specifically allow a witness with a lesser opportunity to perceive the
events in question than the hearsay declarant, courts would be forced
to grapple with the minimum level of percipience needed to satisfy
the reliability concerns of the amended exception. Undoubtedly,
there is a sliding scale of perception, with some witnesses being as
percipient as the hearsay declarant, while others will be far less
percipient. A percipient witness amendment will require courts and
litigants to struggle with the array of fact patterns along this
spectrum, which will introduce inefficient complexities into the
already labyrinthine world of hearsay exceptions.
Any proposal to foreclose the use of e-hearsay through a percipient
witness requirement also overlooks the net positive that the texting
and tweeting revolution may bring to the trial process.
Contemporary technology generates and preserves millions of
hearsay statements each day.276 Rather than crafting rules to rigidly
exclude such e-hearsay, evidence scholars should consider the
potential improvements to the adversary process from additional
electronically preserved information. The Federal Rules of Evidence
are designed to ensure that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings
justly
determined.277
The
availability
of
contemporaneous information regarding disputed events promises to
advance the important goal of generating accurate trial outcomes.278
The Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended to foreclose
access to such information only when it undermines this goal.
Because of the proliferation of communication through electronic
outlets, more hearsay information will be generated and preserved
for potential use in litigation.279 To the extent that such e-hearsay
provides previously unavailable insights into disputed factual issues at
trial, the existence of Facebook status updates and tweets may
improve the accuracy of trial outcomes. Imagine the personal injury
plaintiff seeking damages for permanent physical injuries that

275. Id.
276. Marshall Kirkpatrick, Twitter Hits 50 Million Tweets Per Day; Still Dwarfed by
Facebook & YouTube, READWRITEWEB (Feb. 22, 2010) http://www.readwriteweb.com/
archives/twitter_hits_50_million_tweets_per_day_remains_dwa.php
(comparing
number of messages, posts, and videos that are added to the various social-media
outlets).
277. FED. R. EVID. 102.
278. See Seigel, supra note 243, at 896 (“Achieving justice in the context of the
fact-finding portion of a trial means determining the truth—that is, obtaining an
accurate, unbiased picture of a historical event.”).
279. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 355 (indicating that modern communication
devices make it more likely that hearsay will be preserved for trial).
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allegedly diminish her quality of life, who posts photographs of
herself on Facebook dancing with friends after the date of the
accident in question. Contemplate the damaging text messages sent
between co-conspirators during the pendency of a conspiracy.
Imagine the defendant in a wrongful death suit arising out of a car
accident who, seconds before the fatal crash, tweeted:
@defendant1
On my way home—OMG traffic!

Such admissions are becoming increasingly important in
contemporary litigation.280 In these examples, e-hearsay unavailable
before the advent of social media sites like Facebook and Twitter,
may be instrumental in resolving hotly disputed issues at trial. Thus,
the culture of electronic communication and social media promises
to be a boon to the truth-seeking process by producing and
preserving information about contested trial issues.281 Of course, the
present sense impression exception would be unnecessary to the
admission of the e-hearsay assertions in these hypothetical cases. The
admissions doctrine could be used to admit them against the posting
parties or their co-conspirators — to the extent that a hearsay
exception was deemed necessary.282
Imagine, however, the contemporary social media counterpart to
the seminal present sense impression in Houston Oxygen Co. v.
Davis.283 Suppose a passenger in defendant’s car tweets moments
before a fatal accident:
280. See, e.g., John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of
Evidence from Social Media Sites, 14 S.M.U. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 465 (2011)
(explaining that these types of scenarios are occurring more frequently due not only
to the pervasiveness of social media, but also due to the “legal profession’s eagerness
to exploit the treasure trove of information to be mined from social networking
sites”).
281. Id.
282. For example, the posting of the photograph could be viewed as hearsay to
the extent that the plaintiff was asserting: “this is me dancing with my friends on
November 30, 2011.” Even so, the admissions doctrine would allow it to be admitted
against her. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a). The tweet by the wrongful death defendant
would not need to be used for its truth to demonstrate careless behavior. The fact of
any tweet while operating a vehicle seconds before the impact could indicate
negligence, regardless of the content of the tweet. This could be argued to be true
even with new voice recognition capabilities given the need to handle the wireless
device while driving at all. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as out-of-court
statements admitted to “prove the truth of the matter asserted”). Therefore, this
tweet would be unlikely to be characterized as hearsay—to the extent that it were so
treated, the admissions doctrine would also allow it in against the tweeting
defendant. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a).
283. 161 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942) (automobile passenger
referred to another car, saying “they must have been drunk” and “we would find
them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept that rate of speed up”).
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@passenger10 5 minutes ago
Driving down Gandy in Dan’s black Rover—about to take
FLIGHT!!

Admitting this against the defendant who crashed his black Land
Rover into the plaintiff’s car on Gandy Street moments after this
tweet, to prove defendant was speeding at the time of the crash,
would require a hearsay exception.284 Because the tweet is not the
defendant’s own assertion, it would not be admissible through the
admissions doctrine.285 If the passenger were available to testify at
trial and testified in defendant’s favor that he was not speeding at the
time of the accident, the inconsistent tweet would be admissible to
impeach the passenger, but would not be admissible as an
inconsistent statement to prove speeding as it would fail to satisfy the
oath and prior proceeding requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A).286 If the passenger died in the accident and was
unavailable to testify, his tweet would likewise not be admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 804.287
The present sense impression exception, as currently configured,
would be an ideal fit, however.
There would certainly be
independent evidence of the event in question—that defendant’s
black Land Rover was driving down Gandy Street at the time of the
tweet —given the collision moments later. Furthermore, the allimportant timing requirement of the present sense impression
exception would be satisfied if the time of the tweet was within
moments of the collision. The passenger was describing an event —
the speed of the Land Rover —while perceiving it drive down Gandy
Street. Where subsequent events demonstrate that the declarant was
in defendant’s car at the time, the passenger’s personal knowledge of
the Land Rover’s speed immediately beforehand would be
established for purposes of the exception. The use of technology to
record the e-hearsay may further help to establish this personal
knowledge requirement as some social media sites are now tracking
GPS information for log-in locations.288 Indeed, Twitter may be able
to place the passenger on Gandy Street close to the scene of the

284. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
285. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a).
286. If the passenger testified for the plaintiff that the defendant was speeding,
the tweet would not be admissible through current Rule 801(d)(1)(B) unless the
defendant charged the passenger with an improper motive or recent fabrication.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
287. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4).
288. See About the Tweet Location Feature, supra note 163 (describing how to
“selectively add location information to your Tweets”).
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accident at the time of the tweet, which would further solidify the
timing and personal knowledge requirements.
While fairness and reliability clearly weigh in favor of admitting this
tweet for its truth to resolve a disputed issue at trial, a percipient
witness amendment to the present sense impression exception would
eliminate its use absent a witness who could corroborate passenger’s
tweet about the speed of the Rover. As the defendant driver would
be the only likely available percipient witness, such corroboration
seems unrealistic. This is but one example of the ways in which ehearsay may benefit the trial process by providing juries with new
sources of information to resolve factual conflicts. One could argue
that it would be better to call the passenger to testify at trial to report
his observation of the black Land Rover to the jury subject to crossexamination than to rely on this e-present sense impression to help
resolve a critical issue. As illustrated above, circumstances will
certainly arise where live testimony is either unattainable or inferior
to the contemporaneous observation.
To be sure, information admitted at trial to aid the truth-seeking
process must be sufficiently reliable to generate superior results.289
Therefore, the use of the present sense impression exception to
admit similar Facebook and Twitter e-hearsay must be accompanied
by some guarantee of trustworthiness. As discussed above, trial
judges carefully scrutinize the requirements of the present sense
impression and have demonstrated a will to exclude hearsay that fails
on any score.290 Therefore, e-hearsay admitted as a present sense
impression under the existing regime enjoys sufficient freedom from
concerns of memory and reliability to justify its use by the fact-finder.
That is not to say that all e-present sense impressions on Facebook or
Twitter are inherently reliable or that the existing present sense
impression exception could not admit some that are potentially
flawed. For example, although the passenger in the earlier example
had personal knowledge of the general speed at which he was
traveling, he may not have carefully noted the speed of the vehicle in
which he was riding before tweeting. In tweeting “about to take
FLIGHT,” the passenger may not have been describing the speed of
the vehicle at all —perhaps he was simply expressing his appreciation
for the look or ride of the vehicle in Twitter jargon. The defendant’s
trial counsel can and should make all of these arguments in response
to the admission of the tweet. The jury is free to consider all of these
289. See Seigel, supra note 243, at 904 (noting that “misinformation can be worse
than no information at all”).
290. See supra Part I.D.
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potential flaws of the e-hearsay and decide how much weight to give a
tweet in assigning fault in the case. Eliminating the tweet from the
consideration of the fact-finder altogether, however, deprives the trial
process of potentially helpful information.291
This debate reflects the age-old discussion as to whether a
particular evidentiary concern should determine the admissibility of
an item of evidence or whether the concern should affect only the
weight given the evidence by the fact-finder.292
Although
commentators have long criticized jurors’ abilities to discount or
ignore evidence of questionable reliability, much contemporary
analysis suggests that jurors may be more perceptive in this regard
than previously believed.293 In light of the benefits of more, rather
than less information, to the trial process and the recognition that
jurors are capable of divining evidentiary weakness with the aid of
skilled legal advocacy, other areas of evidence doctrine have evolved
to allow the fact-finder access to information despite its potential
Rather than amending evidentiary rules to
imperfections.294
foreclose access to electronically preserved information, therefore,
rule-makers should consider the positive impact such additional
evidence may have on the trial process.
D. Amending the Present Sense Impression: Alternative Proposals
For the reasons explored above, a revision of the present sense

291. See Seigel, supra note 243, at 900–01 (“[T]he accuracy of an inductively
reasoned conclusion is highly dependent on the amount of information upon which
it is based.”).
292. Indeed, this debate surfaced in the Supreme Court’s most recent Sixth
Amendment case dealing with hearsay and confrontation rights. See Williams v.
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2265 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reflecting disagreement
among Justices as to whether expert witness’ reliance on hearsay information affects
weight or admissibility of expert testimony).
293. See People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Mich. 1998) (Boyle, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he consequence of such an unfounded and unnecessary
requirement [of extrinsic corroboration of a present sense impression] is that many
trustworthy statements would be excluded simply out of adherence to a formula
premised on an unfounded distrust of the finder of fact.”); see also Mueller, supra
note 243, at 374 (describing how today’s well-educated jurors are “far more
discerning than the simple tests courts apply in excluding hearsay”).
294. For example, common law prohibitions on the admission of interested party
testimony were abolished in the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 601 &
advisory committee’s note. Rather than exclude relevant testimony by interested
parties or convicted felons, the Federal Rules of Evidence elected to permit such
testimony freely, but to allow counsel to impeach testimony by such witnesses—it is
up to the jury to weigh the credibility of such witnesses and determine whether to
accept and reject such testimony. Rather than exclude relevant information that
could be helpful in resolving a dispute due to reliability concerns, the Federal Rules
of Evidence chose to allow the evidence and let the jury utilize lay experience with
human nature in deciding how much weight to give such self-serving testimony.
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impression exception appears to be ill-advised and, at least,
premature. To the extent that concerns mount regarding the
improvident admission of social-media e-hearsay, however, an
amendment to the exception that controls for reliability concerns,
while maintaining the utility of the exception, would be superior to a
percipient witness requirement. Four possible alternatives, which
represent revisions that bring increasingly dramatic change to the
operation of the present sense impression exception, follow.
1.

Making personal knowledge express
Although the personal knowledge of the declarant is currently
required for admission of hearsay through the present sense
impression exception, the personal knowledge requirement is not
expressly enumerated in the text of Rule 803(1).295 One way to
emphasize this guarantor of reliability for trial judges utilizing the
exception is to list the personal knowledge requirement directly in
the text of Rule 803. The recently re-styled Federal Rules of Evidence
make liberal use of a bullet point format in an effort to make
interpretation and application of the rules more readily accessible.296
The drafters could adopt a bullet-point format for Rule 803(1) that
makes the personal knowledge requirement overt and express. For
example, the amended Rule 803(1) could read:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay,
regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression.
A statement describing or explaining an event or condition
Made by a declarant with personal knowledge of the event or
condition
Made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.

Bringing the silent personal knowledge requirement into the body
of the rule could reinforce its importance and ensure that trial judges
give adequate consideration to the existing information supporting
the declarant’s first-hand knowledge before admitting a present sense
impression.
As discussed above, however, amending any single hearsay
exception in isolation threatens unintended collateral consequences
295. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (requiring personal knowledge of hearsay
declarants).
296. See FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note (“Many of the changes in the
restyled Evidence Rules result from using format to achieve clearer presentations.
The rules are broken down into constituent parts, using progressively indented
subparagraphs with headings and substituting vertical for horizontal lists.”).

RICHTER.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

DON’T JUST DO SOMETHING!

8/27/2012 12:18 PM

1719

for others. Adding an express personal knowledge requirement
within Rule 803(1) only could create negative implications for other
rules —litigants and trial judges could perceive that the drafters of
the rules only intended a personal knowledge requirement where
one was expressly enumerated. Thus, it would be necessary to amend
all Rule 803 exceptions to reflect the remaining personal knowledge
requirement to protect against this statutory construction. From an
efficiency standpoint, the amendment could be made to the Rule 803
preamble to express a personal knowledge requirement applicable to
all provisions. What this would add in efficiency, however, it might
sacrifice in efficacy. The emphasis on the personal knowledge
requirement as it applies to the present sense impression could be
lost by its placement in the generally applicable preamble. In
addition, the placement of any such personal knowledge requirement
within the preamble would need to be drafted to reflect Rule 803
hearsay exceptions with relaxed or distinct personal knowledge
requirements, like the business records exception.297
2.

Eliminating “bootstrapping” once and for all
To the extent that trial judges begin indiscriminately admitting
social media e-hearsay, there are other alternatives to a percipient
witness requirement that could bolster the reliability of present sense
impressions. The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of
Evidence could consider adding an “independent evidence”
requirement to Federal Rule of Evidence 802.
As discussed above, Rule 104(a) requires a trial judge to decide
“preliminary questions” concerning the admissibility of evidence.298
According to the United States Supreme Court, a trial judge must
find such requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.299 The
requirements of the hearsay exceptions constitute such preliminary
questions. As discussed in Part I, such a preponderance standard
within Rule 104(a) arguably forecloses use of a hearsay statement
alone to fulfill the threshold requirements for its own admissibility.300
Some information independent of the hearsay statement must lend
support to those threshold requirements before a preponderance
standard can be satisfied. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Evidence
specifically require independent evidence to support the existence of

297. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (requiring source with personal knowledge, but
allowing declarants in hearsay chain without such knowledge).
298. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
299. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
300. See supra Part I.D.2.
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the requisite relationship or conspiracy necessary to support
admissibility of hearsay statements by speaking agents, employees, or
co-conspirators under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).301
To the extent that trial judges begin allowing texts, tweets, or status
updates to serve as the only evidence of the event in question, the
timing of the statement, and the personal knowledge of the
declarant, the Advisory Committee could consider adding the
independent evidence requirement that currently appears in Rule
801(d)(2) to the present sense impression exception.302 That
independent evidence requirement provides some guarantee of the
innate fairness of admitting employee and co-conspirator hearsay
against a party through verification of the relationship between the
declarant and the party.303 Although the Rule 803 exceptions to the
rule against hearsay are premised upon reliability rather than innate
fairness, reliability concerns about e-present sense impressions and
other e-hearsay could be addressed through a similar requirement.
Such an amendment would require the trial judge to find some
independent evidence, apart from the e-hearsay statement itself to
demonstrate the declarant’s personal knowledge of the described
event or condition, as well as the contemporaneity of the statement.
This amendment would prevent the admission of wholly
uncorroborated tweets and Facebook posts like the mischievous
fictional tweet that could have incriminated Sir Walter Raleigh.304
Without some independent evidence suggesting that Lord Cobham
and Sir Walter Raleigh were together at the time of the tweet, the
tweet could not qualify as a present sense impression.305 Although
this would not require a “percipient witness” who could verify the
content of any conversation between the two, it would, at least,
require some independent evidence placing Lord Cobham with Sir
Walter Raleigh at the critical time to demonstrate Lord Cobham’s
personal knowledge of a conversation between the two and the
timing of the tweet while the conversation was ongoing. Applying
301. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
302. Id.
303. See supra Part I.D.2 (describing how the independent evidence requirement
prevents hearsay statements alone from being used to support their own admissibility
in the Rule 801(d)(2) context).
304. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
305. If this hearsay statement were offered against Sir Walter Raleigh at a criminal
trial, it would, of course, also have to satisfy the mandate of Crawford v. Washington, as
well as the hearsay rules. It remains to be seen whether tweets could ever be
considered testimonial given the absence of any official law enforcement nexus with
this mode of communication. But cf. Hossain, supra note 56 (describing
“CrimePush” as new app available on iTunes to report ongoing crime with the push
of a button).
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this proposal to the hypothetical wrongful death case involving the
black Land Rover above, the proponent of the tweet would have to
provide the trial judge with some independent evidence —apart from
the tweet itself —to establish the passenger’s personal knowledge and
observation of the vehicle at the time of the tweet in order to admit it
through the present sense impression exception.
The addition of an independent evidence requirement has several
advantages over a percipient witness requirement. As provided by
Rule 104(a), evidence need not be admissible at trial to aid the trial
judge in assessing threshold requirements of admissibility.306
Therefore, an independent evidence requirement would allow a trial
judge flexibility with respect to the information utilized to establish
the event at issue, the timing of the statement, and the declarant’s
personal knowledge. It would enhance reliability without the rigidity
of a percipient witness requirement that threatens to undermine the
utility of the present sense impression in cases where such a witness is
unavailable or nonexistent. Although independent evidence would
be required by the rule, it would be up to the trial judge to determine
the appropriate quantum of independent evidence to satisfy the
threshold present sense impression requirements. Finally, this
independent evidence requirement is an existing feature of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, with which trial and appellate judges have
experience that can be brought to bear. Rather than introducing a
previously non-existent percipient witness requirement that will
embroil litigants and trial judges in complex problems of
interpretation with no useful precedent to guide them, the
recognized independent evidence requirement could be utilized in
the context of the present sense impression.
Drafting such an express independent evidence requirement
would have to be done with care due to the application of the
doctrine outside the limited context of the present sense
impression.307 Perhaps, a revision could be crafted to apply an
independent evidence requirement throughout Article Eight,
capturing all hearsay exceptions raising bootstrapping concerns.
Although there are multiple possibilities for the placement of such an
amendment, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 seems to represent the
best location for a broadly applicable independent evidence
requirement.308 Federal Rule of Evidence 802 currently reads:
“Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides
306. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
307. See supra Part III.B (discussing problems with single exception amendments).
308. FED. R. EVID. 802.
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otherwise: a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court.” 309 A second sentence could be added to Rule
802, providing that:
In evaluating the admissibility of hearsay, as defined by Rule
801(c), under these rules, the contents of the hearsay statement
shall be considered, but are not alone sufficient to establish the
requirements for admissibility.310

This amendment would create an independent evidence
requirement in the application of all hearsay exceptions within
Article Eight and could ensure that trial judges do not
indiscriminately admit wholly uncorroborated social media e-hearsay
without some independent foundation.
3.

Taking a cue from Rule 804(b)(3)
The present sense impression is not the only hearsay exception to
raise concerns about reliability. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)
allows hearsay statements that are contrary to an unavailable
declarant’s interest to be used substantively in a case.311 Although not
admissible at common law, declarations against a declarant’s penal
interest or those that may subject the speaker to criminal liability are
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).312 Such declarations against penal
interest were not admissible at common law out of fear that criminal
defendants would concoct hearsay statements by third parties
accepting responsibility for their crimes.313 In permitting such
hearsay statements through Rule 804(b)(3), drafters of the rule
accounted for this continuing concern with a requirement that such
statements were not admissible unless “corroborating circumstances
[] clearly indicate[d] [the] trustworthiness [of the statement].” 314
This hearsay exception was recently amended to make this limitation
applicable to such declarations against interest offered by the

309. Id.
310. One potential drafting difficulty would arise from the designation of prior
statements of testifying witnesses and admissions under Rules 801(d)(1) and (2) as
“not hearsay.” Including the modifier “as defined by Rule 801(c)” could serve to
signal that even those statements would be covered by the Rule 802 independent
evidence requirement because statements allowed in through 801(d)(1) and (2) fall
within the definition of hearsay provided by Rule 801(c).
311. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
312. Id.
313. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (“The refusal of the
common law to concede the adequacy of a penal interest was no doubt indefensible
in logic . . . .”).
314. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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prosecution, as well as the accused in a criminal case.315
Adding a similar requirement of clear corroboration to Rule
803(1) represents another alternative to a percipient witness
requirement. This amendment would reflect a significant change in
the existing requirements for admissibility of a present sense
impression and would certainly call for exclusion of present sense
impressions admissible under the previous two proposals. While an
amendment requiring clear corroboration would be more stringent
than existing requirements, it would still allow for more flexibility
than a rigid percipient witness requirement.316 A trial judge would
have to find strong corroboration of a present sense impression
before admitting it, but would be able to draw such corroboration
from multiple sources and would not be limited to verification by a
percipient trial witness.317
Like the independent evidence
requirement explored above, the clear corroboration requirement
already exists within the framework of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.318 Because trial judges and litigants have experience
applying this requirement in the context of Rule 804(b)(3), this
standard could be applied to the present sense impression with ease.
This amendment might foreclose admissibility of Lord Cobham’s
tweet, absent any corroboration of the content of the conversation
between Lord Cobham and Sir Walter Raleigh.319 It would still allow
the admission of the tweet by the Land Rover passenger in light of
the subsequent collision involving that vehicle and the passenger’s
obvious personal knowledge of the speed of the vehicle in which he
was riding.320 Importantly, it would also likely allow text messages like
the one admitted in the Damper case, where the defendant admitted
shooting the victim and corroborated some discussion or

315. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (“Rule 804(b)(3) has been
amended to provide that the corroborating circumstances requirement applies to all
declarations against penal interest offered in criminal cases.”).
316. Professor Bellin rejects the utility of a corroboration amendment to the
present sense impression because it leaves courts “free to accept virtually anything as
corroboration.” See Bellin, supra note 6, at 367 (discussing New York’s approach to
present sense impressions).
317. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 8:131, at 200 (“[T]he
requirement is satisfied by independent evidence that directly or circumstantially
tends to prove the same points for which the statement is offered.”).
318. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B) advisory committee’s notes (“The requirement of
corroboration should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of
circumventing fabrication.”).
319. See supra Part I.D.2.
320. See supra text accompanying note 286 (stating that the admission of a
passenger’s tweet to prove the driver was speeding would require a hearsay
exception).
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disagreement with the victim that caused him to reach for his gun.321
4.

Moving the present sense impression to Rule 804
Another alternative for the amendment of the present sense
impression exception to protect against the indiscriminate admission
of e-hearsay would be to transfer the present sense impression
exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 804.322 This transfer would
permit the admission of present sense impressions only in the event
that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial.323 The existing
requirements of unavailability would control access to a present sense
The current description of the present sense
impression.324
impression could be moved to Rule 804(b).325
This amendment would be consistent with the emphasis on the
Best Evidence principle that has pervaded evidence scholarship.326 It
would ensure that litigants do not strategically utilize ambiguous and
powerful e-hearsay in place of available live testimony that promises
to supply the fact-finder with superior information about underlying
events. If such live testimony could be had, a present sense
impression exception within Rule 804(b) would not allow the
hearsay.327 When an available declarant testifies at trial regarding the
events described by her present sense impression, she could, at least,
be impeached with the statement to the extent that her testimony is
inconsistent with the prior statement. To the extent that her trial
testimony is consistent with the present sense impression, the witness
could potentially be rehabilitated with the present sense impression
following impeachment. Some present sense impressions may fit
within the existing hearsay exception under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) for
prior consistent statements where the declarant testifies.328 Placing
the present sense impression within Rule 804 would thus preserve the
321. State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
322. Although Professor Bellin briefly mentions this as a possible alternative to a
percipient witness requirement, see Bellin, supra note 6, at 373, he rejects it in favor
of a percipient witness amendment as the optimal fix for the present sense
impression in the Twitter age, id. at 375.
323. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (listing several ways in which a witness can be
considered unavailable).
324. Id.
325. Indeed, there is currently an available position within Rule 804(b)(5) where
the present sense impression could fit. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
326. See, e.g., Seigel, supra note 243, at 904 n.39 (“[T]he best evidence rule
permits alternative evidence to be offered when the best evidence is unavailable.”).
327. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(requiring unavailability of a declarant for purposes of
the Rule 804 hearsay exceptions).
328. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (allowing for the substantive use of a prior
consistent statement where the witness has been charged with recent fabrication or
improper motive or influence).
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strong preference for trial testimony over hearsay, without
eliminating the present sense impression from consideration entirely.
Where such live testimony is truly unavailable within the meaning
of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a), however, the present sense
impression could provide important information that would
otherwise be lost to the trial process with a percipient witness
amendment. Rather than excluding evidence because alternative
evidence is inaccessible (a percipient witness), an unavailability
requirement would admit evidence when it is most needed—when
alternative information is unattainable. Indeed, an amendment that
favors admissibility in the absence of alternative avenues of proof is
more consistent with underlying values in the Federal Rules
framework, like those found in the ubiquitous Rule 403.329 The
existing requirements for the admission of present sense impressions
would provide adequate insurance that e-hearsay is free from the risks
of faulty memory and mendacity to justify their admission when the
declarant is unavailable.
This amendment would also foreclose use of the present sense
impression of Lord Cobham, where he was famously available but not
brought to confront Sir Walter Raleigh.330 To the extent that the
passenger in the hypothetical wrongful death scenario described
above was alive and available to testify, his present sense impression
would also be excluded, but could be used to impeach any testimony
contrary to his tweet.331 Importantly, in domestic violence cases and
murder cases like Damper, where the victim is unavailable to testify,
the present sense impression would not be lost to the trial process.332
Eliminating the present sense impression exception as it currently
stands in Rule 803(1) and moving it to Rule 804 has significant
drawbacks, however. One of the fundamental reasons for the
existence of the present sense impression is the potential for such
hearsay statements to provide information that is actually superior to
live testimony.333 Because the statements describe underlying events
or conditions contemporaneously, they do not suffer from the
problems of faulty or reconstructed memory that often plague trial
329. FED. R. EVID. 403.
330. See Bellin, supra note 6, at 336.
331. See supra text accompanying note 280 (presenting a scenario where a tweet
about the traffic was admitted in wrongful death litigation).
332. See State v. Damper, 225 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)
(authenticating a text message through the use of testimony and circumstantial
evidence).
333. See United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasizing
the importance of the caller “speaking about the events as they were actually
happening, rather than describ[ing] past events” (internal citations omitted)).
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testimony given months or years after the events in question.
Further, the contemporaneous nature of the assertions and
observations can sometimes alleviate possible changes in witness
incentives that intervene between events at issue and the trial process.
Allowing present sense impressions to be admitted only when the
declarant is unavailable ignores their potential superiority over live
testimony even when the declarant is available. Thus, although it is
preferable to a percipient witness amendment, transferring the
present sense impression exception to Rule 804 would result in a net
loss of evidence available to resolve trial disputes.
CONCLUSION
It is, without doubt, the height of fashion to suggest changes to
long-standing legal principles to adapt to contemporary
communication norms. While vigilance is important to ensure that
modern technology does not undermine traditional legal protections,
not all doctrine is equally susceptible to transformation by the
technological revolution. Because the hearsay doctrine has proved
equal to the task of regulating human communication in all of its
evolving formats, it represents one area that need not be overhauled
to adjust to the contemporary culture of communication.
Specifically, the present sense impression exception is capable of
controlling admission of this emerging brand of e-hearsay. As
described by this article, e-present sense impressions may add new
value to the trial process. As such, proposals to undermine the
exception by imposing a rigid percipient witness requirement should
be viewed with caution. As the technological e-hearsay revolution
races forward, we need not charge in to “do something,” but may
safely elect to “stand” by and allow judges and litigants to adapt using
existing evidentiary rules.

